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THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 
OF 1980: CURBING UNRESTRICTED 
THIRD-PARTY SEARCHES IN THE 
WAKE OF ZURCHER V. STANFORD 
DAILY 
Journalists historically have been the victims of abusive govern-
ment search and seizure.1 As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
"(t]he use by government of the power of search and seizure as 
an adjunct to a system for the suppression of objectionable pub-
lications is nothing new."2 Modern American journalists, how-
ever, had largely forgotten this historical experience until the 
Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.8 That 
decision, upholding the constitutionality of newsroom searches, 
once again raised the specter of policemen barging into new-
srooms to search for journalists' materials.• To assuage these 
' For more than 200 years after the practice was instituted in the 1500's, English 
monarchs used the state's search and seizure power to harass journalists and suppress 
objectionable publications. The practice finally ceased after Lord Camden in Entick v. 
Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765), declared it illegal. See generally N. LAssoN, 
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION 23-51 (1937); F. SIEBERT, FftEEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND (1952). 
• Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961). The Supreme Court also has 
recognized that "[t]he Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge 
that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling 
liberty of expression." Id. at 729. See also Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-65 
(1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886). 
• 436 U.S. 547 (1978). For a discussion of the Zurcher holding, see pt. I A infra. As far 
as commentators have been able to determine, the newsroom search in Zurcher was un-
precedented. See Citizen Privacy Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1978) (pre-
pared statement of Philip Heymann, Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General) [herein-
after cited as Senate Hearings]. 
' Perhaps the best illustration of the vision Zurcher conjured in journalistic minds is 
the statement of Howard K. Smith of ABC News: 
When I was a new young reporter at the United Press in Berlin ... there was a 
knock on the door . . . and 15 Gestapo men barged past me, began opening 
every desk and studying every piece of paper they could find. Six hours later, 
they left. I remember thanking God this couldn't happen in America. Well, now 
it can. [Zurcher] is the worst, most dangerous ruling the Court has made in 
memory. 
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 147-48 (appendix to testimony of the Reporter's Com-
mittee for Freedom of the Press). Editorial reaction to Zurcher from other journalists 
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fears, Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (the 
"Act"):1 
Congress, however, did not go far enough. The Act protects 
primarily the press and others engaged in disseminating infor-
mation to the public. 6 Yet Zurcher permits the police to search 
persons suspected of possessing criminal evidence whether or 
not they are engaged in informing the public.7 All persons - not 
just journalists - are now subject to unnannounced police 
searches. 8 By limiting the Act's protections primarily to the 
press, Congress has failed to remedy Zurcher's impact on the 
privacy rights of the general public. 8 This failure to protect all 
third parties adequately from unrestrained police searches is a 
major shortcoming of the congressional response to Zurcher. 
This article analyzes the Privacy Protection Act as a response 
to Zurcher. Part I discusses the Zurcher.decision and its effect 
on First and Fourth Amendment rights, as well as its impact on 
state testimonial privileges. Part II critically examines key fea-
tures of the statute, focusing on the parties and materials pro-
tected, the police practices regulated, the remedies provided for 
violations, and the Act's constitutional underpinnings. Part II 
also offers suggestions for remedying the problems the Act cur-
rently presents. The article concludes that the Privacy Protec-
tion Act, while a necessary first step to minimizing the impact of 
Zurcher, is inadequate to address all the issues raised by un-
was equally vituperative. See generally Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 158-60 (1979) (appendix D to testimony of 
the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press) [hereinafter cited as House 
Hearings]. 
• Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa) [here-
inafter cited as Privacy Protection Act]. 
• See id. § 101. 
• See pt. I A infra. 
• It should be remembered that historically journalists were not the only ones who 
suffered as a result of abusive government search and seizure. For example, in the Amer-
ican colonies, the most oppressive instrument of state search and seizure power - the 
writs of assistance - were directed primarily at colonial merchants suspected of smug-
gling goods to avoid customs duties. See generally Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 364-
66 (1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). 
• Congress has elsewhere shown a continuing concern for safeguarding the privacy 
rights of American citizens. See, e.g., the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 3401 (Supp. II 1978) (protecting customers of financial institutions from unwarranted 
intrusions into their financial records); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976) (pro-
tecting the personal privacy of individuals from invasion by federal agencies). 
In addition, the Carter Administration sent several proposals to Congress for greater 
protection of personal privacy because of the potential threat posed by modem technol-
ogy. See Hucker, Carter Sends Congress Sweeping Plan To Protect Individual Privacy 
Rights, 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 641 (1979). 
SPRING 1981] Privacy Protection Act 521 
restricted third-party searches. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Zurcher Decision 
Zurcher was the first case in the federal courts to decide 
whether the police can search non-suspects using a warrant 
rather than a subpoena duces tecum. 10 The case arose when Palo 
Alto police obtained a warrant to search the Stanford Daily, 
Stanford University's student newspaper, for photographs of a 
campus demonstration.11 The newspaper sued the police after 
the search, claiming that the search violated its First and Fourth 
Amendment rights because the police did not resort to a sub-
poena to obtain the desired evidence.12 The federal district court 
agreed, and adopted a "subpoena first" rule for seaching non-
suspects: police must use subpoenas duces tecum rather than 
warrants to search non-suspects unless the police can show that 
a subpoena would be "impractical."18 The court said that absent 
a showing of impracticality, searching non-suspects by means of 
a warrant is a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment.14 In 
addition, the court said that where the police plan to search a 
newsroom, the First Amendment requires an especially high 
showing of impracticality.111 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 18 
1
• Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 127-28 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
11 The police sought photographs taken by Daily staffers of a demonstration at the 
university's hospital at which demonstrators attacked several policemen. The Daily was 
a non-suspect; it was neither implicated in the demonstrations nor suspected of any 
criminal activity. The search, described by the district court as "quite thorough," lasted 
about 15 minutes. Police searched filing cabinets, baskets and desk drawers. According to 
plaintiff's affidavits, the "officers were in a position to see notes taken by reporters in the 
course of interviews which contained information given in confidence and on the under-
standing that the name of the source would not be disclosed." Only photographs and film 
already published were recovered. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 550-51. 
11 Id. at 552. 
1
• The district court held that the police cannot obtain a warrant to search for materi-
als held by a non-suspect unlesa the magistrate issuing the warrant has probable cause, 
supported by sworn affidavits, that the materials sought would be destroyed or removed. 
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. at 127. 
14 Id. 
10 The district court held that where a newsroom is to be searched, the First Amend-
ment requires a clear showing that (1) important materials will be destroyed or removed 
from the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would be futile. Id. at 135. 
1
• Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed.17 The Court held 
that the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment18 - on 
which the District Court relied for its "subpoena first" rule -
does not require the police to resort to a subpoena when search-
ing non-suspects.19 The Court rejected the district court's con-
clusion that it is per se unreasonable to employ a warrant when 
a subpoena could have been used. In effect, the Court said that 
the existence of probable cause automatically establishes the 
reasonableness of issuing the warrant, regardless of whether or -
not the party being searched is a suspect. ao The majority noted 
that probable cause is all that traditionally was required for is-
suance of a valid warrant;11 probable cause, in turn, only re-
quires a reasonable belief that the evidence sought is located at 
the place to be searched. The criminal culpability of the prop-
erty owner is irrelevant to the initial determination whether or 
not to issue a warrant. 19 Therefore, said the Court, a warrant 
may issue to search both suspects and non-suspects as long as 
probable cause is established. 118 The Court rejected any consider-
ation of the privacy rights of non-suspects in determining 
whether a warrant should issue because it said "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and 
1
• 436 U.S. at 553. 
1
• The first clause of the Fourth Amendment protects citizens against "unreasonable 
searches and seizures." See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure 
. . . against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause .... ). Commentators disagree on the relationship 
of this clause to the warrants clause which follows it. Three theories exist. The first is 
that the reasonableness of a search is determined solely by the existence of a warrant 
that satisfies the requirements of probable cause and specificity contained in the war-
rants clause. A second theory suggests that even if all the requirements of the warrant 
clause are met, a search pursuant to a warrant still may be unreasonable on independent 
grounds. The third theory holds that the requirements of the warrants clause only apply 
to warranted searches and that the reasonableness clause provides an additional search 
power for warrantless searches. See Comment, Third Party Searches in the Face of 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Toward a Set of Reasonableness Requirements, 11 CONN. L. 
REv. 660, 661-62 (1979). 
" Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 560. 
00 The Court said that "valid warrants . . • may be issued when it is satisfactorily 
demonstrated . . . that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the 
premises." Id. at 559. See also note 23 infra. 
11 436 U.S. at 554. 
•• Id. at 554-56. The Court noted that "search warrants are not directed at persons; 
they authorize the search of 'place[s]' and the seizure of 'things,' and as a constitutional 
matter they need not even name the person from whom the things will be seized." Id. at 
555. 
11 The Court pointed out that "The critical element in a reasonable search is not that 
the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are located on the property 
to which entry is sought." Id. at 556. 
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public need."14 Once probable cause is established, said the 
Court, privacy rights must yield to the "fundamental public 
interest" in law enforcement. H 
The Court also noted that a "subpoena first" rule would entail 
"hazards to criminal investigation much more serious than the 
District Court believed.,,.. First, the alleged non-suspect actually 
may be involved in the crime under investigation; H the party to 
be searched is culpable, using a subpoena would warn him of the 
impending search, permitting him to dispose of the evidence 
sought. Second, even if the party to be searched is not culpable, 
he might be sympathetic to the actual criminal and notify him 
of the search. Third, the real culprits may have access to the 
premises where the evidence is located and can use the delay 
involved in securing evidence by subpoena to destroy the mater-
ials sought.17 In addition, because subpoenas are easier to obtain 
initially, the Court was skeptical of the contention that sub-
poenas provide significantly more privacy protection than a 
warrant.18 
Turning to the free speech challenge, the Court also dismissed 
the argument that the First Amendment requires a "subpoena 
first" rule for newsroom searches. The Court said nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment exempts the press from police searches as 
long as probable cause is established.19 Although it acknowl-
edged that warrant requirements must be observed with "partic-
ular exactitude"80 when First Amendment interests are involved, 
the Court said that "no more than this is required."81 Normal 
Fourth Amendment requirements - probable cause, specificity, 
and overall reasonableness - are, as the Court pointed out, suf-
ficient to protect the press from abusive police searches. 81 The 
Court also remained unconvinced that newsroom searches would 
affect adversely the ability of journalists to gather news from 
confidential sources. 88 
14 Id. at 559 . 
.. Id. at 554. 
"Id. at 561. 
.., Id . 
.. Id. at 562-63. 
"Id. at 565. 
00 Id. See Stanford v. Teus, 379 U.S. 476 (1965). 
11 436 U.S. at 565 . 
.., Id . 
.., Id. at 566. The Court cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), where it had 
rejected similar claims by the presa in holding that journalists could be compelled to 
reply to grand juey subpoenas even though thia might threaten confidential sources. For 
a diecusaion of journalists' confidential sources, see notes 58-59 and accompanying text 
infra. 
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B. The Impact of Zurcher: Subpoena v. Warrant 
Zurcher dramatically expanded the permissible scope of un-
announced police searches. 34 In rejecting the district court's 
"subpoena first" rule, the Court said that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not provide any greater protection for persons not 
suspected of criminal activity ,811 and thus placed both suspects 
and non-suspects on an· equal footing with respect to police 
searches. The Court also rejected the notion that the First 
Amendment requires greater safeguards when a newsroom is the 
object of a third-party search. 
Reaction to Zurcher was swift and critical, both by legal com-
mentators38 and by Congress. 37 The criticism was directed pri-
marily at the Court's failure to recognize that although a sub-
poena duces tecum is not as effective an investigatory tool as the 
warrant, it is far more protective of individual privacy because it 
provides notice and an opportunity to object, and because it is 
less intrusive. 38 Because of this failure, critics pointed out that 
04 This expansion was made possible by the Court's decision in Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294 (1967), abandoning the so-called "mere evidence" rule. Before 1967, the 
Court distinguished between merely evidentiary materials, which could not be searched 
for by warrant even if poBSeBBed by a BU8pect, and contraband or the fruits and instru-
mentalities of crime, which could be seized by warrant. See Harris v. United States, 331 
U.S. 145 (1947); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). It was only after the Court 
abandoned this distinction in Warden that third party searches for evidentiary materials 
became an iBBue. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 577-80 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
86 In fact, the Court noted that until recently, the Fourth Amendment was thought to 
be "more protective where the place to be searched was occupied by one suspected of 
crime .... " 436 U.S. at 555. 
86 See generally Cantrell, Zurcher: Third Party Searches and Freedom of the Press, 
62 MARQ. L. REv. 35 (1978); Note, Search and Seizure in the Newsroom-Constitutional 
Implications for the First and Fourth Amendments-Zurcher v. The Standard Daily, 28 
DEPAUL L. REV. 123 (1978); Note, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Newsroom Searches Held 
Valid, 15 IDAHO L. REv. 167 (1978); 9 CuM. L. REv. 869 (1979); 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 150 
(1979); 1979 Wis. L. REv. 660. But see Note, Search Wa"ants and the Press: Zurcher v. 
The Stanford Daily, 8 CAP. U.L. REv. 595 (1979) . 
.., In CongreBB, the first Zurcher bill was proposed in the House on June 2, 1978, only 
two days after the Supreme Court decided Zurcher. See H.R. 12952, 95th Cong., 2d Sees. 
(1978). The first Senate bill was proposed on June 5, 1978. See S. 3164, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sees. (1978). Sixteen bills eventually were introduced in the 96th CongreBS alone. In the 
Senate, four bills were filed: S. 115, S. 855, S. 1790 and S. 1816; on the House side, 
Representatives introduced a dozen Zurcher bills: H.R. 283, H.R. 322, H.R. 368, H.R. 
380, H.R. 1293, H.R. 1305, H.R. 1373, H.R. 1437, H.R. 3486, H.R. 3781, H.R. 3837 and 
H.R. 4181. S. 1790, as amended, eventually became the Privacy Protection Act. 
18 The chief advantage of the warrant over the subpoena as an investigatory tool is 
that the warrant allows the police to act quickly without notice to the person whose 
property is to be searched. The lack of notice minimizes the risk of removal or destruc-
tion of the evidence sought before the police can seize it. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; 
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the Court did not adequately consider the adverse consequences 
of unrestricted third-party searches. In particular, critics decried 
the decision because of its anticipated impact on (1) the privacy 
rights of non-suspects, (2) freedom of the press to gather and 
disseminate news, and (3) state testimonial privileges for attor-
neys and other professionals. 
1. Zurcher and the right to privacy- Zurcher·critics believe 
that search warrants pose dangers to individual privacy rights 
which subpoenas do not, and that subpoenas therefore should be 
pref erred unless compelling law enforcement considerations out-
weigh the privacy interests involved. 39 In Zurcher, however, the 
Supreme Court minimized the dangers to privacy posed by 
third-party searches. The Court said that because of the require-
ments of probable cause and specificity,•0 and because of the in-
volvement of neutral magistrates,n warrant procedure provides 
safeguards adequate to insure that police searches do not unnec-
essarily infringe on privacy rights. 
Theoretically, of course, warrant procedures are designed to 
protect privacy rights adequately. But these safeguards, how-
ever, are illusory. In many jurisdictions, for example, the "de-
tached and neutral magistrate" required to issue a warrant does 
not have to be a lawyer.41 This lack of legal training is significant 
because nonlawyers are less able than lawyers to apply the high-
see also Note, Newsroom Searches Held Valid, supra note 36, at 177; Note, Search and 
Seizure of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 
28 STAN. L. REv. 957,992 (1976); 13 SuwoLK U.L. REv. 150, 153 n.22 (1979): By contrast, 
however, a subpoena is more protective of privacy rights. Subpoena procedure provides a 
mechanism for pre-seizure objection which provides notice to the party possessing the 
desired evidence. In addition, the subpoena is less intrusive because it does not permit 
the police to enter property to search for the evidence sought; instead, a subpoena only 
directs the person to whom it is issued to produce certain evidence before the issuing 
court at a specified time and place. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). See also Note, 
Newsroom Searches Held Valid, supra note 36, at 174-78; 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 150, 153 
n.22 (1979). 
19 See, e.g., Note, Newsroom Searches Held Valid, supra note 36, at i74-78. 
•• The Fourth Amendment specifically states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also 
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
" The Supreme Court has said that only "detached and neutral magistrates" may 
issue warrants. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Chapman v. United States, 
356 U.S. 610 (1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Searches conducted 
"outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967). This requirement of prior judicial approval is subject only to a few "jealously and 
carefully drawn" except\ons. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). For a dis-
cussion of some of these exceptions, see note 124 and accompanying text infra . 
•• Y. KAMlsAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3 (4th ed. 1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Y. KAMlsAR et. al.]. 
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ly technical requirements of probable cause and specificity. Even 
magistrates with legal training fail to scrutinize adequately the 
evidence presented by the police in determining whether prob-
able cause to search exists.48 As a result, they often abdicate this 
responsibility to the police or prosecutors.•• In addition, the po-
lice often are under pressure to falsify or at least color facts to 
establish probable cause.n These problems undermine two key 
safeguards - a neutral magistrate and probable cause - on 
which the Zurcher majority relied. 
Even if the police scrupulously follow warrant procedures, the 
search warrant still involves a greater invasion of privacy than 
the subpoena. For one, the police must physically intrude onto 
the property being searched to execute the warrant. 46 This sub-
jects the property owner to the embarrassment of a police search 
even though he may not be a suspect. 47 In addition, the warrant 
•• See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30 
Mo. L. REV. 391 (1965); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role 
in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987 (1965). 
Both articles conclude that magistrates often grant police requests for warrants without 
an adequate inquiry into the grounds for issuance of the warrant. 
" See Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision, 1964 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 1 (1964). Examining local practices in Kansas, Michigan and Wisconsin, the au-
thors found that in all three states the prosecutor alone made the decision to issue a 
warrant despite statutes in each state providing for varying degrees of judicial interven-
tion. The authors concluded that warrants are issued perfunctorily with "virtually no 
judicial inquiry into the existence of probable cause." Id. at 6. The performance of mag-
istrates under the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976), illus-
trates the degree to which magistrates honor police requests for warrants. Between 1969 
and 1976, magistrates denied only 15 of 5,563 police requests for warrants under the Act. 
In 1977, magistrates approved all 626 applications for warrants. See TwENTY-SEVENTH 
REPORT BY THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS: SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE 
EFFECTS OF THE STANFORD DAILY DECISION, H.R. REP. No. 1521, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7 
(1978). 
•• These pressures exist because of the importance of a good arrest and conviction 
record, and because of the difficulty of achieving such a record after the exclusionary rule 
was extended to the states by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Chevigny, Police 
Abuses in Connection With the Law of Search and Seizure, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (1969); 
Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204 NATION 596 (1967); Comment, Police Perjury in 
Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971). 
Police perjury is facilitated because the affidavits submitted by the police to show 
probable cause can be based on hearsay evidence. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 
102 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 
(1960). If these affidavits are valid on their face, a defendant attacking the accuracy of 
the information on which the police relied to establish probable cause must make a sub-
stantial showing that the false statement contained in the affidavits was knowingly or 
intentionally made before he is entitled to a hearing on the matter. Franks v. Delaware, 
438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
•• See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. See also L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, 
DETECTION OF CRIME 99-120 (1967). 
n In his Zurcher dissent, Justice Stevens noted that: "The dramatic character of a 
sudden search may cause an entirely unjustified injury to the reputation of the person 
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permits the police to "rummage" through personal effects not 
even named in the warrant. Even though the police may search 
only where the items described in the warrant reasonably could 
be concealed,48 many items of highly personal nature may be re-
vealed unavoi~ably in the course of the necessary search.49 Fi-
nally, the warrant provides no possibility of pre-seizure objec-
tion.110 The party being searched has no opportunity to convince 
a judge or magistrate that the search is unnecessary or that it 
should be limited in some way. 
The subpoena, of course, results in none of these hazards. The 
police never enter the property being searched, so no late night 
search of an innocent person with all the attendant embarass-
ment and disruption would occur. In addition, no rummaging 
takes place because the desired evidence is delivered to the court 
by the party in possession rather than by the police. Finally, the 
party being searched may contest the necessity for or scope of a 
subpoena, before the search takes place, thus insuring that the 
invasion of privacy occasioned by the need for criminal evidence 
is minimized.111 Therefore, the subpoena is more protective of 
privacy rights than the warrant. 
The subpoena, however, is not without disadvantages. The 
Zurcher majority stressed that the subpoena entails "hazards to 
law enforcement,"111 making it an unsuitable substitute for the 
warrant as an investigatory device. First, the subpoena is not 
available to the police or prosecutors as an investigatory tool in 
most jurisdictions.118 A "subpoena first" rule in those jurisdic-
searched." 436 U.S. at 580. See also Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme 
Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. RBv. 664, 701 (1961). 
The adverse effect of police searches on reputation is especially acute in those jurisdic-
tions that permit nighttime searches. Although most states require the police to execute 
warrants during the day, 14 jurisdictions authorize searches at any time. See MoDRI. 
CODE OF PR!:-AmwGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 220.2 Commentary (Official Draft No. 1 1972). 
•• See Y. KAMISAR, et. al., supra note 42, at 264. 
•• See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 573 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting): 
[I]n order to find a particular document, no matter how specifically it is identi-
fied in the warrant, the police will have to search every place where it might 
be-including, presumably, every file in the office-and to examine each docu-
ment they find to see if it is the correct one. 
00 The party being searched is notified only after the police have arrived to search the 
premises. The party can object to the search only after it has been executed. See, e.g., 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)-(f). 
•• See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). 
" 436 U.S. at 561. 
" While several jurisdictions grant prosecutors the power to issue investigatory sub-
poenas, see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-801 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.001 (1973), most 
jurisdictions deny prosecutors this power. See UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
231, 432, Comment (Proposed Final Draft, 1974). The police also are denied the power to 
issue investigatory subpoenas. See Note, Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 
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tions would be unworkable. Second, the subpoena notifies the 
party being searched that an investigation is underway and that 
the party is in possession of evidence relating to that investiga-
tion." This provides the party being searched with an opportu-
nity to remove or destroy the evidence before the police can 
seize it. IHI Third, the availability of pre-seizure proceedings 
makes the subpoena unsuitable for quick action." Because of 
these drawbacks, the subpoena is not as effective an investiga-
tory tool as the warrant. Since the public interest in the produc-
tion of criminal evidence is substantial, the "subpoena first" rule 
should not apply to those situations where the efficacy of crimi-
nal investigations will be undermined to an extent not war-
ranted by the public's countervailing interest in personal 
privacy. 
2. Zurcher and freedom of the press- Newsroom searches 
threaten the constitutional rights of the press in two ways. First, 
police searches inhibit the ability of the press to gather informa-
tion for the public. Second, newsroom searches endanger the 
ability of the press to disseminate the information gathered.117 
Reporters often rely on confidential sources when gathering 
much of the information they publish or broadcast.118 Police 
searches inhibit information gathering by making confidential 
sources reluctant to talk to reporters about sensitive matters. By 
creating a danger that the names of these informants will be 
38, at 965. 
04 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). 
"" This possibility greatly concerned the Zurcher majority. See 436 U.S. at 561. 
.. A number of objections are available, and these objections take time to litigate. For 
example, the Zurcher majority noted that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination may be asserted by the recipient of a subpoena but not by an individual 
whose privacy is invaded by a police search. The prosecutor, said the Court, would rarely 
be able to overcome an assertion of this privilege in the early stages of an investigation 
when most warrants are issued. The Court said that the delay in overcoming the privi-
lege would inhibit "the production of evidence with sufficient regularity to satisfy the 
public interest in law enforcement." 436 U.S. at 561 n.8. Subpoenas also may be quashed 
on other grounds. See A. AMsTElmAM, TRIAL MANuAL FOR THE l>BFBNSE OF CRIMINAL 
CASES§ 163 (3d ed. 1974). The Court pointed out that "time spent litigating such mat-
ters could seriously impede criminal investigations." 436 U.S. at 561 n.8. 
•• The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects the rights of 
the press to both gather and disseminate information to the public. See Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,681 (1972) (" .•. without some protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated); Grosjean v. Associated Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233 (1936) (First Amendment protects the right of the press to publish) . 
.. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 Mien. L. RBv. 229 
(1971); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their 
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. RBv. 18 (1969). See generally Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings 
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1972). 
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exposed during the course of the search, newsroom searches 
threaten to dry up these sources of information. No matter how 
carefully the warrant is executed, the police necessarily must 
rummage through files and desks to locate the materials named 
in the warrant. This "rummaging" is likely to expose the names 
of confidential informants even when they have no connection 
with the investigation. Confidential sources, naturally sensitive 
to being· uncovered, are likely to refuse to talk to reporters 
rather than run the risk that a newsroom search will expose 
them.119 
Newsroom searches also threaten the ability of the press to 
disseminate information. One way this occurs is through self-
censorship by reporters. The threat of a police search may cause 
reporters to omit references in their stories to evidence pos-
sessed by their newspapers that may trigger a search, either to 
protect confidential sources from exposure or to save themselves 
the ordeal of a police search. eo In either case, the effect may be 
to deny valuable information to the public.81 
•• See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 572 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting): "It 
requires no blind leap of faith to understand that a person who gives information to a 
journalist only on condition that his identity will not he revealed will he less likely to 
give that information if he knows that, despite the journalist's assurances, his identity 
may in fact he disclosed." For more on the effect of disclosure on confidential sources, 
see Note, Newsmen's Privilege Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amend• 
ment in Jeopardy, 49 TuL. L. REv. 417 (1975); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: 
Protection of Confidential Associations and Private Communications, 4 U. Mica. J.L. 
REF. 85 (1970); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confi· 
dential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 316 (1970); Note, The Newsman's Privilege: Govern· 
ment Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CALII'. L. RBv. 
1198 (1970). 
00 The comments of Gene Roberts, New York Times national news editor, illustrate 
the potential for self-censorship: 
If reporters and photographers believe that the information they gather will he 
available to government officials, they will not he eager to get the sensitive story, 
or to track down the individual who will supply the critical information. And I, 
as an editor, will consider carefully before publishing facts or a photograph 
which might imply that there is more than appears. 
Brief for Amici Curiae at 22, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), reprinted in 
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 197. 
•• The effect of newsroom searches on the First Amendment rights of the press is 
analogous to the "chilling effect" which the Supreme Court has in other contexts used as 
a basis for striking down laws which deter or discourage the exercise of First Amendment 
rights. This chilling effect occurs because of the possible applications of an overbroad 
statute or rule which, although directed at activities that may be regulated, is so broad as 
to possibly encompass protected activities. The Supreme Court has been particulary con-
cerned with the chilling effect on First Amendment rights in the area of legislative inves-
tigations, a government activity closely analogous to the police search. See Gibson v. 
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415 (1963). See also DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 
825 (1966) (attorney general investigation). For a discussion of "chilling effect," see gen· 
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More significantly, police searches may result in the removal 
of information necessary for publication. Zurcher does not re-
quire the police to wait until publication before searching; once 
they learn that a newspaper possesses criminal evidence, the po-
lice may obtain a warrant and seize the evidence whether or not 
it has been published. 82 By removing the information from the 
newsroom, the police, in effect, can block publication of any 
story that depends on that information. In addition, the search 
itself may disrupt normal newspaper operations.68 If the search 
occurs near deadlines, the disruption may be sufficient to pre-
vent publication of an entire edition." 
Use of subpoena would alleviate these concerns in several 
ways. First, a subpoena does not involve a physical intrusion 
into the newsroom. Thus the police would have no occasion to 
"rummage" through desks and files, which minimizes the risk of 
unnecessary exposure of confidential sources. The lack of physi-
cal intrusion also would obviate the risk of disruptions due to 
the search itself. Second, a subpoena provides an opportunity 
for pre-seizure objection. The newspaper may be able to quash 
the subpoena altogether, or at least modify it to release only a 
minimum of information. This reduces the risk that confidential 
sources will be compromised. The notice and opportunity to ob-
ject provided by subpoena procedure also would allow enough 
time for the newspaper to copy the information sought, thereby 
eliminating the risk that the police will be able to block publica-
tion by removing materials from the newsroom. The subpoena, 
erally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 808, 822-25 
(1969). 
91 Nothing in normal warrant procedure requires the police to wait to execute a search 
once they have established probable cause. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. In Zurcher, 
however, this problem did not arise because the search occurred after publication. 
83 For instance, police searched the offices of a Los Angeles radio station for eight 
hours before concluding that the evidence sought was not on the premises. See Note, 
Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 38, at 957. See also Senate Hearings, 
supra note 3, at 285-86 (testimony of Tom Becherer, news director, WBAL-TV Balti-
more, on the potential physical disruption caused by newsroom searches). 
84 A police search, therefore, poses a real danger of resulting in a "prior restraint" on 
publication. Protection against prior restraints is at the core of the First Amendment, 
and the Supreme Court has traditionally struck down such restraints. See New York 
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 
402 U.S. 415 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Lovell v. 
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
In Zurcher, however, the Court rejected the newspaper's prior restraint arguments. 
The Court found prior restraint cases inapplicable because it said newsroom searches 
carry "no realistic threat of prior restraint or of any direct restraint whatsoever . . . on 
... publication." 436 U.S. at 567. 
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therefore, is more protective of press freedom than the warrant. 
However, neither the district court's "subpoena first" rule nor 
the Zurcher rule permitting unrestricted third-party searches is 
entirely satisfactory from a law enforcement standpoint. With 
respect to the "subpoena first" rule, the same "hazards to law 
enforcement" that are present whenever a third party is sub-
poenaed also are present when a reporter is subpoenaed. For ex-
ample, reporters will be notified of the impending search and 
. thus will have an opportunity to conceal or destroy the desired 
evidence. 811 These legitimate law enforcement concerns caution 
against application of a "subpoena first" rule for all newsroom 
searches. On the other hand, Zurcher itself may work to thwart 
law enforcement in the press context. Police and prosecutors 
often use newspaper stories for leads when conducting investiga-
tions.66 These investigations naturally will suffer if the sources 
for these stories are discouraged from contacting the press for 
fear of exposure during the course of a newsroom search. In ad-
dition, reporters faced with the possibility of being searched may 
prefer to destroy notes and other evidence in their possession as 
soon as these materials are no longer necessary for their 
stories.67 Consequently, valuable criminal evidence may be lost. 
3. Zurcher and state testimonial privileges- The broad 
search and seizure power authorized by Zurcher also could sub-
vert state testimonial privileges. Almost all states recognize, by 
common law or statute, a number of privileges from the duty to 
testify.es The oldest and most common is the attorney-client 
• For example, there were indications in Zurcher that the Stanford Daily had adopted 
a policy of destroying photographs of camp\18 demonstrations if served with a subpoena. 
436 U.S. at 575 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
• See statement of John Leonard, president of the National District Attorney's Asso-
ciation, 227 NATION 102 (1978): "Prosecutors ... often depend heavily on the published 
stories of newsmen for leads into investigations of criminal activity, and much of the 
information is obtainable for such stories only if confidential sources are 888ured 
anonymity." 
.., The chief of the Lee Newspapers bureau in Helena, Montana wrote Congressman 
Robert Drinan that the day after Zurcher was announced, "my office began erasing all 
tapes and destroying or removing from the premises all confidential records .... " Id. 
Columnist Carl Rowan noted that reporters are now "committing notes and sources to 
memory, burying papers in tin cans or empty whiskey bottles .... " Id. And columnist 
James Kilpatrick has said he might have to place his files "six feet deep in a sanitary 
landfill." Id. 
• At common law, "there is a duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and 
... any exemptions which exist are distinctly exceptional." 8 WIGMORB, EvmBNCB 
§ 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Privileges from testifying were not favored at common 
law becaU8e they interfered with the search for truth and conflicted with the maxim that 
"the public ... has a right to every man's evidence." Id. Nonetheless, privileges persist 
because certain values override the general duty to testify. In the case of most privileges, 
the value promoted is free communication between the protected parties. The theory is 
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privilege,69 but testimonial -privileges also exist for doctors,70 
psychologists,71 and priests.71 In half the states, "shield laws" 
protect a journalist's confidential sources from exposure.78 These 
privileges are designed to foster certain beneficial relationships 
by creating an atmosphere of. complete confidentiality. 
Zurcher, however, permits the police to circumvent these priv-
ileges. When third parties protected by a testimonial privilege 
are subpoenaed, they normally may quash the subpoena on the 
basis of the privilege. 7' A subpoena maintains confidentiality be-
cause it allows the third party to object before seizure of the 
evidence. A warrant, however, makes an objection to the search 
based on the existence of a testimonial privilege impossible be-
cause it provides no mechanism · for pre-seizure objections. The 
police, therefore, can sidestep the privilege by employing a war-
rant rather than a subpoena. 711 Even if the third party later sue-
that if communications between parties are protected from disclosure, it will encourage a 
free interchange which is deemed essential to the working of a socially beneficial rela-
tionship. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EvmENCE 606-07 
(1977). For a compilation of states rec~izing testimonial privileges of one kind or an-
other, see generally 8 WIGMORE, supra; at § 2197 . 
.. In general form, the attorney-client privilege provides that: 
[w)here legal advice of any kind is sought·from a professional legal advisor in his 
capacity as such, the communication relating to that purpoee, made in confi-
dence by the client, are at his insistence permanently protected from disclosure 
by himself or by the legal advisor, except the protection be waived. 
8 WIGM0RE, supra note 68; at § 2292 at 554. For examples of modem attorney-client 
privilege statutes, see NEV. REv. STAT; §§ 49.035-n.115 (1971); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03 
(West 1975). 
•
0 A physician-patient privilege exists by common law or statute in two-thirds of 
American jurisdictions. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 68, at § 2380. 
71 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1516 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-25-9 (1974). 
These statutes must be distinguished from those creating a psychiatrist-patient privilege, 
which would be encompassed by the general physician-patient privilege existing in many 
states. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 68, at § 2286 at 534 n.23. 
•• See, e.g., ARK. UNIFORM RULES OF EvmENCE 505. 
78 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1956); MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.5a (1970). 
See generally Note, Newsmen's Privileges Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes, supra 
note 59, at 429. · 
Most of these statutes, however, only pertain to subpoenas directed at newsmen; they 
do not restrict the availability of search warrants. Nevertheless, these statutes evidence a 
state policy that the confidential relationship between reporters and their sources should 
be protected. 
" See A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 56, at § 163. 
,. The potential for subverting state testimonial privileges is illustrated by the ex-
perience of one Minnesota lawyer whose offices were searched only two months after 
Zurcher. Similar problems have arisen in California and Oregon. See Law-
scope-Criminal Justice, 65 A.B.A.J. 1777 (1979). See also Senate Hearings, supra note 
3, at 223-78 (testimony of Jerome -S. Seigler, Chairman, American Psychiatric Assoc. 
Comm. on Confidentiality, on the effects of Zurcher on the confidentiality of patient 
records). 
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ceeds in recovering the seized evidence,78 the search and seizure 
will have destroyed confidentiality. This will deter future confi-
dential exchanges and undermine the relationships the privilege 
was meant to protect. 
Here again, however, a "subpoena first" rule poses problems 
for law enforcement in certain situations. One concern raised by 
opponents of a "subpoena first" rule was that criminals would 
use the rule as a shield by placing potentially incriminating evi-
dence in the hands of their supposedly innocent attorneys.77 Ob-
viously, the policy behind the "subpoena first" rule stands op-
posed to such a result, and the rule should be limited so that 
such situations do not occur. Congress should consider the possi-
ble impact of a "subpoena first" rule intended to safeguard testi-
monial privileges on law enforcement interests, and tailor its leg-
islation to minimize that impact. 
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the unrestricted third-
party police searches Zurcher authorized have the potential for 
undermining important rights and liberties. 78 On the other hand, 
a broad "subpoena first". ·rule applicable to all third-party 
searches may create intolerable burdens on law enforcement. 79 
In passing the Privacy Protection Act, Congress was well aware 
of these competing considerations. ao_ As a result, the Act repre-
•• Under some circumstances, a third party can petition the court for the return of 
materials seized in Ii police search. See A.. AMlrrBRDAM, supra note 56, at § 224. 
" See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 15 (statement of Sen. William L. Soott). 
•• In Zurcher, however, the Supreme Court dismissed the effect of unrestricted third-
party searches on individual rights as insubstantial. For example, in rejecting journalists' 
fears of the "chilling effect" that newsroom searches would cause, the Court said it was 
not convinced "that confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress 
news because of fears of warranted searches." 436 U.S. at 566. The Court pointed out 
that there have been "only a very few instances in the entire United States since 1971 
involving the issuance of warrants for searching newspaper premises." Id. See House 
Hearings, supra note 4, at 165-56 (AppendiI B, statement of the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press) (detailing 14 newsroom searches that have occurred since 
1971); see also TIME, Aug. 11, 1980, at 66 (describing two press searches occurring since 
the Zurcher decision). The key concern, however, is not with how many newsroom or 
other third-party searches already have occurred but rather with how many will occur in 
the future now that the Supreme Court has declared such searches legal. See Bayh, Con-
gressional Response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 13 INmIANA L. RBv. 835, 861-62 
("there is every reason to believe that the number of third party searches will increase"). 
,. Opponents of Zurcher legislation, however, have greatly exaggerated these "bur-
dens" on law enforcement. See notes 97-102 and accompanying text infra. 
00 See, e.g., the comments of Sen. Birch Bayh, one of the strongest supporters of 
Zurcher legislation: 
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sents an accommodation of the individual's rights and liberties 
with the public interest in effective law enforcement. 81 
The Act is divided into two parts. Title I, "First Amendment 
Privacy Protection," defines unlawful acts, prohibiting searches 
and seizures of certain materials unless one of several broad ex-
ceptions apply. The number of applicable exceptions depends on 
the kind of materials sought by the police. If the police are 
searching for "work product," only two exceptions to the general 
no-search rule exist. 811 If, however, the police are searching for 
"documentary materials," an additional two exceptions apply.88 
Moreover, Title I stipulates that the Act does not apply to all 
third-party searches, limiting its scope to searches of persons 
who intend to disseminate a "form of public communication."" 
Finally, Title I establishes remedies for violations of the statu-
tory scheme, providing generally for a civil cause of action, 
under certain circumstances, against both the individual officer 
involved and the governmental entity responsible for the of-
fender.811 It also provides for liquidated damages,88 and grants 
the federal district courts original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Act. 87 
Title II of the Act provides some protection for third parties 
not covered by Title I. This portion of the Act mandates that 
the United States Attorney General promulgate guidelines for 
the conduct of federal third-party searches not involving persons 
disseminating a "form of public communication."88 It also re-
quires that the guidelines incorporate certain provisions. 811 
It is a very delicate . . . issue that we are dealing with. . . . It requires . . . a 
delicate balance. On one side, we have no desire . . . to tie the hands of law 
enforcement .... [On the other hand], if you are innocent ... you shouldn't 
have a knock on the door in the middle of the night. 
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 12-13. 
81 See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS PRIVACY PRoTEcnoN 
Acr OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1064, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
HOUSE REPORT]; SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PRIVACY PROTECTION Acr OF 1980, S. 
REP. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPoRT]. See 
also Bayh, supra note 78, at 844. 
u Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at§ lOl(a). "Work product" and "documen-
tary materials" are defined at § 107. 
u Id. § lOl(b) . 
.. Id. § 101. The Act specifically includes newspapers, books, and broadcasts under the 
heading of "public communication." 
88 Id. § 106(a). 
• Id. § 106({). 
"" Id. § 106(h). The Act, however, does not apply to "searches and seizures at the 
borders of, or at international points of, entry into the United States in order to enforce 
the customs laws of the United States." Id. § 105. 
• Id. § 201(a). 
• Id. § 201(a)(l)-(4). 
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The Act is designed to address the issues raised by Zurcher 
and to accommodate both the privacy and press interests. in-
volved, and the countervailing law enforcement interests. The 
Act, however, tips the balance too heavily in favor .of law en-
forcement by (1) leaving large groups of third parties affected by 
Zurcher largely unprotected, (2) creating unnecessary loopholes 
for the police to circumvent the protections that are afforded, 
and (3) providing ineffective remedies for police violations. 
A. Parties Protected 
One of the key concerns of Zurcher critics was the decision's 
impact on privacy rights,90 a concern that provided a strong im-
petus for passage of the Privacy Protection Act. The title, how-
ever, is a misnomer because the Act does not protect the general 
public's right to privacy. The substantive provisions of the bill 
safeguard only those third parties involved in information dis-
semination. The key to the legislation is the concept of "public 
communication; the Act only protects persons who intend to dis-
seminate to the public a "form of public communication."91 The 
Act does not attempt to protect any particular group but instead 
strives to safeguard the flow of information to the public.91 
Thus, while reporters clearly come within the purview of the 
statute, the Act also protects academicians, authors, filmmakers, 
free lance writers and photographers. 93 By focusing on the infor-
mation involved rather than on specific groups, the Act avoids 
the thorny problem of defining "the press.',.. However, because 
00 Except for the Department of Justice, "not a single witness in favor of the legisla-
tion testified that the protections of the bill should be limited to the press alone." Hou8B 
REPORT, supra note 81, at 4. Journalists, in fact, "were among the strongest proponents 
of expanding the legislation to protect all innocent third parties from arbitrary search 
and seizure." Id. 
01 Section 101 of the Act, which deals. with unlawful acts, prohibits searches of "a 
person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, 
book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication." This language is in-
tended to protect only those persons engaged in First Amendment activities of some 
kind. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 81, at 5-6; SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 9-10. 
" The drafters specifically rejected the idea of a "press only" bill. Instead, the statute 
was designed to "avoid the chilling effects of disruptive searches on the ability to obtain 
and publish information for all those who have a purpose to disseminate information." 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 9. See also HousE REPORT, supra note 81, at 5. 
" HousE REPORT, supra note 81, at 5 . 
.. The problems of defining "the press" prevented Congress from passing a federal 
ahield law to protect reporters from investigatory subpoenas in the wake of Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), which approved the use of such subpoenas directed at jour-
nalists. See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 352 (prepared statement of Philip Hey-
mann, Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General). The Act's drafters were well aware of the 
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the Act only protects persons possessing information to be dis-
seminated to the public, it excludes a large portion of non-sus-
pects affected by Zurcher. In addition, the legislation does not 
specifically protect persons who may be covered by state testi-
monial privileges, another -group threatened by Zurcher . .,, 
The main justification for not including all third parties 
within the scope of the Act was that it would increase the risk of 
impeding criminal investigations by requiring that the proce-
dures established by the Act be applied to a greatly expanded 
class of persons." These concerns, however, are greatly exagger-
ated. First, opponents of a broad third-party search bill over-
stated the importance of search warrants to criminal investiga-
tions. In fact the majority of searches are conducted without a 
warrant as an incident to arrest,.., or under one of the other ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement. 98 Search and seizure also is 
only one of a number of avenues open to the police to obtain 
criminal evidence." Second and more importantly, a non-sus-
pect in the vast majority of third-party search situations will re-
linquish the desired evidence voluntarily when served with a 
subpoena. A true non-suspect will have no connection with the 
crime or the criminal involved and thus have little motive for 
"extreme difficulties of arriving at a workable definition of the press." HouSB RBPoRT, 
supra note 81, at 5. 
" Like all other third parties not involved in information dissemination, persons 
covered by state testimonial privileges are-fu be protected at the federal level by J11Stice 
Department guidelines governing the issuance of warrants to search third parties. Pri-
vacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 201(a)(3). At the state level, however, third par-
ties not involved in information dissemination are left to the mercy of state legislatures. 
" See SENATE 8.BPoRT, supra note 81, at 8. See generally House Hearings, supra note 
4, at 164-79; and Senate Hearings, ·supra note 3, at 296-325, for a disCl18Bion of law 
enforcement concerns . 
., See Y. KAMisAR, et. al., supra note 42, at 5, 266; L. TlnANY, D. McINTYRE & D. 
RoTENBERG, supra note 46, at 105. 
Of course, one may question why there is such great concem with third-party searches 
when the police do not depend heavily on search warrants. There are two reasons why 
the concerns are still valid. First, it is likely that third-party searches will increase now 
that the police know they are authorized· to conduct such searches. Second, although 
third-party searches may not occur often, their impact on privacy rights is substantial in 
those cases where they do occur. For these reasons, third-party searches should be re-
stricted even though they are not now widely 118ed. 
18 Y. KAMlsAR, et. al., supra note 42, at 266. For a discl18sion of exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, see note 124 and accompanying text infra. 
" For example, the police gather much information through direct observation or sur-
veillance, "tips" from the public or informants, access to public records, and interroga-
tions of victims. See Note, Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 38, at 993-94. In 
fact, it has only been since 1967 that the police could search for evidentiary materials by 
means of a warrant, even from s11Spects. See note 34 supra. This further undermines the 
police contention that extending the "subpoena first" rule to all third parties would 
create intolerable burdens on law .~orcem~nt. 
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withholding evidence from the police. 100 Where the police have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the non-suspect will not vol-
untarily cooperate, carefully defined exceptions to the "sub-
poena first" rule will protect law enforcement interests ade-
quately.101 Finally, the risk to criminal investigations posed by a 
broad third-party search rule can be. minimized by requiring a 
lesser burden of proof to show that a subpoena would be imprac-
tical in the case of persons not involved in information dissemi-
nation. •os No reason exists, therefore, for a blanket exclusion of 
the great majority of persons affected by Zurcher. 101 
100 As pointed out by the Zurcher dissenters, "(c]ountless law-abiding citizens -doc-
tors, lawyers, merchants, customers, bystanders-may have documents that relate to an 
ongoing criminal investigation." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 579 (Stevena, J., 
dissenting). There is no justification for assuming, as opponents of a broad third-party 
search rule do, that these normally law-abiding citizens will ignore a subpoena and pro-
ceed to conceal or destroy evidence. · 
To make this assumption, however, third parties who possess purely documentary 
materials must be distinguished from those that possess other types of criminal evidence 
such as contraband. Third· parties who possess documentary evidence may be quite com-
mon· and possession of this type of evidence alone does not suggest that the third party is 
sufficiently culpable to have a motive for destroying or concealing evidence. But posses-
sion of evidence such as contraband indicates that the third party has a sufficient con-
nection with the crinle that he cannot be trusted to preserve the evidence sought. In such 
situations, resort to a subpoena would indeed be "impractical" and a warrant would be 
justified. This was recognized by the Zurcher dissenters, id. at 579-82, and is reflected in 
the Privacy Protection Act's provision excluding "contraband or the fruits of crinle or 
things otherwise criminally possessed" from the statute's scope. Privacy Protection Act, 
supra note 5, at § 107(a)-(b). 
1
•
1 For example, the Act excludes from the "subpoena first" requirement those situa-
tions where the police have a reasonable belief that the third party being searched will 
remove or destroy the evidence sought if notified of the impending search. Privacy Pro-
tection Act, supra note 5, at § 101(b)(3). For other exceptions to the "subpoena first" 
rule, see notes 134-154 and accompanying text infra. 
Where reasonable doubts arise about the willingness of a non-suspect to cooperate, 
these doubts probably will be resolved in the police's favor because warrants are ob-
tained e:c parte before sympathetic magistrates. See Note, Search and Seizure of the 
Media, supra note 38, at 986. This provides additional assurance that law enforcement 
interests will be adequately safeguarded. 
100 For example, while the statute currently requires that the police establish by 
"probable cause" that the person possessing information to be disseminated to the pub-
lic is a suspect, § lOl(a)(l), the Act could require only "reason to believe" as the stan-
dard for a third party not involved in disseminating information. But see note 161 and 
accompanying text infra for a discussion of problems with this standard. 
108 In fact, there are administrative reasons for including all third parties within the 
purview of the Act. As law enforcement officials themselves have pointed out, most war-
rants are sought in the early stages of an investigation when there is little information 
available about the person being searched. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 
319 (statement of the National District Attorney Association). The Act as it stands now, 
however, requires that the police determine w~ether or not a person possesses informa-
tion to be disseminated to the public because the Act only protects information dissemi-
nators. Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at§ lOl(a)-(b). This determination must be 
made at the warrant proceeding, precisely when the police have the least information 
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The Act does attempt to protect those third parties not in-
volved in informing the public by mandating that the Justice 
Department develop guidelines for third-party searches not cov-
ered by the Act.104 The guidelines, which apply to any federal 
officer or employee who seeks documentary materials possessed 
by a non-suspect in connection with a criminal investigation,106 
must recognize "the personal privacy interests of the person in 
possession of such documentary materials,"106 particulary those 
of third parties such as lawyers and clients or doctors and 
patients who are involved in a "known confidential relation-
ship. "107 The guidelines also must call for use of the least intru-
sive means of obtaining the information sought.108 Except in 
emergencies, a United States Attorney must approve an applica-
tion for a warrant under the guidelines.109 When adopted, the 
available to them. This would delay and in some cases totally frustrate the warrant pro-
ceeding. See note 168 and accompanying text infra. By eliminating the distinction be-
tween third parties who are disseminating information and those who are not, a determi-
nation of whether or not the Act applies would be unnecessary-it always would apply 
unless the party being searched is a suspect. This would streamline the warrant proceed-
ings by eliminating one step and thus minimize the risk of delay. 
1°' Section 201 of the Act provides that: 
The Attorney General shall ... issue guidelines for the procedures to be em-
ployed by any Federal officer or employee, in connection with the investigation 
or prosecution of an offense, to obtain documentary materials ·in the private pos-
session of a person when the person is not reasonably believed to be a suspect in 
such offense or related by blood or marriage to such a suspect, and when the 
materials sought are not contraband or the fruits or instrumentalities of an 
offense. 
The Justice Department has proposed guidelines to comply with § 201. Department of 
Justice Guidelines on Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third Par-
ties, 46 Fed. Reg. 1302 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. pt. 59). The guidelines estab-
lish procedures to be used by "any federal officer or employee, in connection With the 
investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, to obtain documentary materials in the 
private posseBBion of a disinterested third party." Id. § 69.3(a). The guidelines require 
the use of a "subpoena, summons or other less intrusive alternative means" rather than a 
warrant unleBB this would "substantially jeopardize the availability or usefulness of the 
materials sought." Id. § 69.4(a)(l). They also require that any application for a warrant 
to search third parties be approved by a United States Attorney. Id. § 69.4(a)(2). The 
guidelines also provide for additional protections where the use of a warrant "may in-
trude upon professional, confidential relationships." Id. § 69.4(b). For violations, the 
guidelines provide that the violator "shall be subject to disciplinary action by the agency 
or department by which he is employed." Id. § 69.6(a). They do not, however, specify 
what form this disciplinary action shall take. 
106 Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 201(a). 
108 Id. § 201(a)(l). 
107 Id. § 201(a)(3). 
108 Id. § 201(a)(2). The drafters expected that the guidelines would require an informal 
request or a subpoena whenever these present an effective alternative to search by war-
rant, subject to exceptions paralleling those contained in the statute for searches of per-
sons involved in information dissemination. SENATE RBPoRT, supra note 81, at 19. 
109 Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 201(a)(4). In emergencies, another "ap-
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guidelines will have the full force and effect of Justice Depart-
ment regulations, and any employee or officer violating the 
guidelines is to be subject to disciplinary action. 110 
The guidelines are unlikely, however, to protect the privacy 
rights of a majority of non-suspects adequately. First, the guide-
lines are only binding on the federal government, yet the Justice 
Department and the statute's drafters recognized that most 
third-party searches occur at the state and local level.111 Second, 
violations of the guidelines cannot be litigated.111 The only sanc-
tion provided for noncomplicance is disciplinary action by the 
Justice Department itself, 118 and this is inadequate because law 
enforcement officials are reluctant to discipline themselves. 114 
The Act, therefore, should have covered all third parties in its 
substantive provisions. 
Extending the Act's protections to all non-suspects, however, 
will not adequately protect all the interests at stake. Although 
such a change will safeguard the public's general right to pri-
vacy, it will not protect the special interest in confidentiality 
that third parties such as journalists and professionals covered 
by state testimonial privileges possess. These third parties de-
serve additional protection from police searches because of the 
societal interest in protecting the confidentiality of these rela-
tionships, an interest not present with most other third parties. 
This interest in confidentiality will not be adequately protected 
by merely extending the Act's protections to all third parties be-
cause circumstances justifying an invasion of the public's general 
propriate supervisory official" may approve the application for a warrant, but a U.S. 
Attorney must be notified within 24 hours. 
no Section 202 of the Act states that "any violation of these guidelines shall make the 
employee or officer involved subject to appropriate disciplinary action." Privacy Protec-
tion Act, supra note 5, at § 202. 
111 See note 199 and accompanying text infra. 
111 Section 202 provides that "an issue relating to the compliance, or the failure to 
comply, with guidelines issued pursuant to this title may not be litigated." Privacy 
Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 202. In addition, evidence obtained in violation of the 
guidelines cannot be suppressed or excluded solely because of such violation. Id. 
§ 106(e). The drafters apparently agreed with the Justice Department that litigability 
would be "both burdensome and unnecessary to achieve the purposes of the guidelines." 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 20. The drafters, however, said they expected "good 
faith" compliance with the guidelines. Id. 
111 See note 110 supra. 
,.. Police departments are notoriously lax in punishing officers for search and seizure 
violations. See Gelles, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and 
Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 621, 718. In addition, municipal leaders responsible 
for overseeing police departments rarely pressure the police to abide by search and 
seizure requirements. See Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 Y ALB L.J. 781, 
812-14 (1979). 
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right to privacy may not justify intruding on this greater interest 
in confidentiality. To protect this interest, the Act should pro-
vide that where the police intend to search a party involved in a 
known confidential relationship,1111 the materials seized must be 
sealed without examination and placed in the court's custody 
until the court determines that the need for the materials out-
weighs the special interest in confidentiality enjoyed by these 
parties.116 If the court determines that the interest in confidenti-
ality is outweighed, the police are assured that the materials will 
be immediately available; if the court decides that this interest 
is not outweighed, the materials can be returned with confidenti-
ality still intact. 
B. Protection Afforded 
1. The general "no search" rule- The portion of the Act 
defining unlawful acts tracks in substance the district court's 
"subpoena first" rule rejected in Zurcher. Congress clearly in-
tended that subpoenas would be the customary means of search-
ing third parties unless one of several exceptions applied. This 
portion of the Act, however, contains two significant drafting 
errors that should be corrected to insure that the Act is not mis-
interpreted: (1) the operative sections seem to prohibit even 
searches conducted by means of a subpoena unless one of the 
several exceptions apply, and (2) these sections also seem to out-
law warrantless searches altogether. Congress intended neither 
of these results when it passed the Act. 
The statute's language flatly prohibits searches and seizures of 
111 This would include all journalists and any professionals who are protected by that 
state's testimonial privileges. The Act, in fact, already requires that the Attorney Gen-
eral, in promulgating guidelines for searching third parties not covered by the Act, must 
recognize the "special concern for privacy interests in cases in which a search or seizure 
. . . would intrude upon a known confidential relationship such as that which may exist 
between a clergyman and parishioner; lawyer and client; or doctor and patient." Privacy 
Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 201(a)(3). 
11
• See, e.g., H.R. 3837, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which provides that search war-
rants "shall prescribe appropriate provisions to protect all privileged matters, and such 
protection shall include . . . sealing or guarding such objects without examination until 
such non-suspect can be heard by the magistrate or judge." The American Law Institute 
has suggested a similar provision in another context. See MODEL CODE or PRE-ARRAIGN-
MENT PROCEDURE § 220.5 (Official Draft No. 1, 1972). While this procedure may be un-
workable in certain cases where the police must examine documents to determine 
whether or not they are encompassed by the warrant, see note 49 and accompanying text 
supra, it at least will minimize the intrusion into confidential matters in the majority of 
cases. 
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certain materials unless one of several exceptions apply.117 This 
language, however, is misleading because Congress meant to re-
strict only surprise police searches conducted by means of a war-
rant.118 Subpoena searches are outside the scope of the Act's 
prohibitions; the police may always resort to a subpoena to ob-
tain desired evidence regardless of whether or not they would be 
entitled to use a warrant under the Act. The Act, therefore, 
should specifically state that it applies only to warrants, and 
that subpoena searches are outside its ambit. The Act should 
not, however, use the term "subpoena" to refer to alternatives to 
warrants. Many jurisdictions do not permit the police to use 
subpoenas as an investigatory device. 119 In some jurisdictions, 
for example, investigatory subpoenas are available only through 
grand jury proceedings and these proceedings may not be in ses-
sion at the time of the search. 11° Consequently, the police in 
these jurisdictions would be forced always to rely on warrants to 
conduct third-party searches, and they would have no recourse if 
they could not satisfy one of the exceptions to the "subpoena 
first" rule in the Act. Congress, however, did not intend to force 
the police always to rely on warrants to search third parties .. 
. The Act, therefore, should make clear that only warrants are 
subject to the restrictions on searches and seizures stated in the 
statute. It also should indicate that any mechanism by which the 
party to be searched is notified of the impending search and al-
lowed to object, including but not limited to subpoenas duces 
tecum, suffices to escape the Act's requirements for warrants. 111 
117 Under the section detailing "unlawful acts," for example, the Act states that "it 
shall be unlawful for a government officer or employee . . . to search for or seize any . . . 
materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to 
the public a . . . form of public communication." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, 
at § 101. Because the Supreme Court has said that subpoenas of evidentiary materials 
are "searches" subject to Fourth Amendment requirements, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 
(1906), the phrase "search for or seize" in § 101 could be misinterpreted as prohibiting 
even searches conducted by means of a subpoena. 
11
• It is clear that the drafters distinguished warrants from subpoenas and only in-
tended to subject warrants to the restrictions of the statute. See, e.g., HousB RBPoRT, 
supra note 81, at 4 ("It [the Act] does not prohibit lawful searches of third parties. It 
simply requires the use of a subpoena first to obtain documentary materials unless any 
one of five exceptions ... apply."). See also SENATE RBPoRT, supra note 81, at 11 ("only 
two exceptional circumstances will allow a search warrant procedure instead of a sub-
poena")(emphasis added). 
119 See note 53 and accompanying text supra. 
110 See Bayh, supra note 78, at 856. 
111 The statute provides a one-year grace period from the date of enactment "so that 
state and local governments will have sufficient time to make any necessary procedural 
changes in their laws to comply" with the Act. SENATE RBPoRT, supra note 81, at 17-18. 
Such changes, however, would be unnecessary if the statute simply recognized that 
searches conducted after notice and an adversary hearing are not within its ambit. See, 
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As long as notice and an opportunity to be heard - the essen-
tial features of a subpoena - are provided, the statute's restric-
tions should not apply.m 
The statute's language also seems to prohibit warrantless 
third-party searches.118 There are many situations, however, 
where the police do not need a warrant to execute a search. In 
these situations, the normal warrant requirement is excused be-
cause there is a need to move quickly and circumstances make it 
impractical to obtain a timely warrant.114 Requiring the police to 
resort to a subpoena when the circumstances excuse the use of a 
warrant is illogical, and would upset an established body of law 
regarding warrantless searches. The Act should explicitly state 
that it is not meant to affect the law regarding searches without 
a warrant, and that the police do not have to comply with its 
provisions where a warrantless search would be justified. 
2. Materials protected: "work product" and "documentary 
materials"- The Act only protects certain kinds of materials,111 
e.g., H.R. 283, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) ("It shall be unlawful for any person acting 
under color of law, without a prior adversary court proceeding, to search any 
place .... ") (emphasis added). 
111 Although the statute should avoid use of the term "subpoena," this article will 
continue to use the phrase "subpoena first" for convenience. 
111 This was a major concern of law enforcement officials in testimony before Congress. 
See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 303 (testimony of James Zagel, Counsel for the 
National District Attorneys Association). 
114 Although searches conducted without a warrant nomially are per se unreasonable, 
see note 41 supra, the Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. The most important exception is the search incident to arrest. The Court 
has allowed warrantless searches of the person of a validly arrested person, United States 
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and of 
the immediate area under the control of the arrested person, Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 
797 (1971); Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Warrantless searches also have 
been upheld in exceptional circumstances where "seizure is impossible except without a 
warrant." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56 (1925) (upholding a warrantless 
automobile search "because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or juris-
diction in which the warrant must be sought"). Other exceptional circumstances may 
arise in the course of an emergency where entry is needed to protect property or to save 
lives. See generally Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Re-
quirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 419 (1972). 
In addition, warrantless searches are permitted where the person being searched 
consents to the search. United States v. Matson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
111 The Act only protects materials intended for dissemination to the public in a "form 
of public communication." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 101. This term, 
however, is meant to have a broad meaning. It includes not only materials to be dissemi-
nated to the public or which contain information to be incorporated in a public commu-
nication, but also materials gathered for the purpose of disseminating them to the public 
but which at some point are determined to be unsuitable for publication. For example, a 
reporter may write a story which is not published; the reporter's notes and drafts of the 
article are nevertheless protected. However, there must be an intent to disseminate in-
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distinguishing between materials defined as "work product" and 
those defined as "documentary materials." This distinction, 
however, does not make sense in terms of the First Amendment 
values the Act is intended to protect. Moreover, the distinction 
creates administrative headaches for the police at a time in the 
investigatory process where delays can be critical. Work product 
is defined as materials "prepared, produced, authored or created 
. . . for the purposes of communicating such materials to the 
public."198 It includes the "mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or theories" of the author.117 The term is patterned af-
ter the definition of work product in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. m Documentary materials, on the other hand, are 
simply "materials upon which information is recorded."'be It in-
cludes "written or printed materials, photographs, motion pic-
ture films, negatives, video tapes, audio tapes, and other 
mechanically, magentically [sic] or electronically recorded cards, 
tapes or discs."180 Neither term includes the fruits or instrumen-
talities of crime, or contraband. 131 Possession of such materials 
makes the third party sufficiently culpable to justify a surprise 
search.1311 
formation to the public; where such intent is lacking, the materials are not protected. 
Thus, the internal records of a business, for example, would not constitute a "form of 
public communication" because they are not intended for public disclosure. See SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 81, at 10. 
111 Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 107(b). The definition is intended to 
cover "materials whose very creation arises out of a purpose to convey information to the 
public." SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 17. Such materials may be created by the 
person in possession of the materials or by another person in anticipation of public com-
munication. For example, financial records of a business obtained by a member of the 
press are not work product because they were not originally created "to communicate to 
the public." But a report prepared by a reporter based on those records would constitute 
work product, as would a report prepared by a "whistle-blower" in government who in-
tends that the contents be disclosed to the public. Id. 
The photographs which were the subject of the search in Zurcher would be "work 
product" under the Act. HousE REPORT, supra note 81, at 12. 
117 Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 107(b)(3). 
111 SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 17; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3), governing dis-
covery of attorneys' work product. 
'" Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 107(a). 
ISO Id. 
'" The fruits of crime are the ends or objects that a criminal intends to obtain from 
his criminal activity. An example is stolen property. The instrumentalities of crime are 
those things, such as burglar tools, that facilitate the commission of a crime. Contraband 
is goods or things, such as narcotics, the possession of which is a crime. See SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 81, at 16-17. 
181 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (possession 
of such materials "gives rise to two inferences: that the custodian is involved in the crim-
inal activity, and that, if given notice of an intended search, he will conceal or destroy 
what is being sought"). See also note 100 supra. 
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a. The "work product" exceptions- The drafters of the 
statute apparently felt that work product is more worthy of pro-
tection than documentary materials because work product in-
volves a creative mental process.188 Accordingly, the Act permits 
the police to search for work product by means of a warrant in 
only two exceptional circumstances. The first is where the party 
in possession of the evidence sought is suspected of involvement 
in the crime under investigation.184 This exception is obvious; 
the notice provided by a subpoena gives suspects the opportu-
nity to conceal or destroy evidence.1811 The exception, however, is 
qualified by a proviso that if the only crime of which the party 
being searched is suspected is the receipt or possession of the 
materials sought, the suspect exception does not apply. 188 This 
proviso prevents police, who may actually be seeking to uncover 
confidential sources or to block publication, from searching 
newsrooms on the pretense that the reporter possesses "stolen 
property. "187 
The proviso is subject to a qualification, however. The suspect 
exception to the "subpoena first" rule is retained where the 
crime under investigation concerns the receipt, possession or 
communication of secret or restricted data.188 The gravity of 
these crimes led the drafters to retain the search power in these 
circumstances.189 This exception, however, provides a potential 
loophole for government officials to plug embarrassing leaks of 
information to the press. For example, the qualification could 
have authorized the police to search for and seize the documents 
used to publish the Pentagon Papers, because many of these 
materials were classified at the time. 140 As a result, public debate 
11
• SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 10. 
114 The statute permits surprise searches where there is "probable cause to believe 
that the person possessing such materials has committed or is committing the criminal 
offense to which the materials relate." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at 
§ lOl(a)(l). 
,.. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
,aa Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § lOl(a)(l). 
••• For example, if a reporter knowingly received a stolen report, the suspect exception 
would apply because the reporter would be guilty of receiving stolen property. The draft-
ers felt that this would unduly broaden the suspect exception because the police could 
charge journalists with receipt of stolen property in many cases. SENATE REPoRT, supra 
note 81, at 11. 
, .. Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § lOl(a)(l) . 
... SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 11. 
"
0 See N. SHEEHAN, H. SMITH, E. KENWORTHY & F. BUTTERFIELD, THE PENTAGON PA-
PERS (1971). See also New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (govern-
ment attempts to restrain publication of the Pentagon Papers rejected on First Amend-
ment grounds). Several journalists testifying before Congress expressed the fear that the 
suspect exception could be used to justify surprise searches for purloined government 
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on issues of extreme importance could be squelched. This quali-
fication, therefore, should be limited to situations where the na-
tional security - not merely the "secret" or "restricted" status 
of the documents sought - is genuinely threatened by 
disclosure. 141 
The second exception to the "subpoena first" rule for work 
product is where the materials sought are necessary to prevent 
death or serious bodily injury. m This exception seems war-
ranted because society's interest in preserving the lives of its cit-
izens justifies the search under any circumstances. 148 
No other exceptions are provided for obtaining work product 
by search warrant. Even if the police believe that the third party 
will conceal ·or destroy the evidence sought if notified of the im-
pending search, they still must resort to a subpoena. 14' The 
drafters apparently felt that the creative processes represented 
by work product are so central to the First Amendment that the 
proper penalty for failure to produce the evidence when subpoe-
naed should be contempt of court. 1411 
b. The "documentary materials" exceptions-Documentary 
materials, however, may be sought by warrant under any of four 
circumstances. In addition to the two exceptions applicable to 
work product, 148 there are two situations where the police may 
search for documentary materials without resort to a subpoena. 
First, such materials may be seized by warrant where there is 
reason to believe that the notice provided by a subpoena would 
result in the destruction, alteration, or concealment of the evi-
dence sought. 147 This exception is justified because the "sub-
poena first" rule is not designed to remove evidence perma-
documents. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 75 (testimony of William Small, 
CBS News Director). 
"' The government should be required to show more than that the materials are clas-
sified or restricted; it should also carry a "heavy burden" of showing that disclosure of 
the material would involve "a direct, immediate and irreparable injury to the national 
security." House Hearings, supra note 4, at 105 (prepared statement of Robert Lewis, 
Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, Society of Professional Journalists). 
141 Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 101(a)(2). 
148 In fact, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the warrant 
requirement for entries necessitated by life-threatening situations. See generally Mas-
colo, supra note 124. Since a warrant is not even required in these situations, it would be 
illogical to require resort to a subpoena. 
144 SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 12. Of course, the person subpoenaed could still 
be prosecuted under destruction of evidence statutes in existence in many states. See, 
e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 162,295 (1971). 
"" SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 12. 
"" Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § lOl(b)(l)-(2). 
"' Id. § 10l(b)(3). For examples of such situations, see HousE REPORT, supra note 81, 
at 9. 
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nently from the reach of the police, but only to provide the 
party being searched with notice and an opportunity to object. 148 
If the notice provided would make the evidence unavailable, 
then the public interest in effective criminal investigations be-
comes overriding, and a search is justified. The drafters listed 
three factors which a magistrate should consider in evaluating 
the likelihood that the evidence will be destroyed or concealed: 
whether there exists a close personal, family, or business rela-
tionship between the party in possession and the suspected 
criminal; whether the party in possession has concealed or de-
stroyed evidence in the past; or whether the party in possession 
has evidenced an intent to conceal or destroy the evidence. 149 
Second, documentary materials may be searched for by war-
rant when the party in possession fails to comply with a sub-
poena, and either all appellate remedies have been exhausted or 
"there is reason to believe that the delay . . . occasioned by fur-
ther proceedings ... would threaten the interests of justice."1'° 
Among the factors which the drafters felt a magistrate should 
consider to decide whether such a threat exists are: the immedi-
acy of the need for the materials; the importance of the materi-
als to the investigation; and the severity of the crime under 
investigation. m 
This "interests of justice,' exception is troubling. Failure to re-
spond to a subpoena after all appellate remedies have been ex-
hausted jutifies a search because the party being searched has 
been afforded an opportunity to object to the police request, and 
the objections have been overruled. The party has been afforded 
his day in court; further refusal to turn over the materials is un-
justified. But the "interests of justice" provision allows the po-
lice to search before the third party has had a full day in court. 
The standard is exceedingly vague11111 and subverts both the 
141 See Bayh, supra note 78, at 860. AB Senator Bayh put it, "[t]he issue of Stanford 
Daily is not whether police may obtain relevant evidence, but how they may obtain it." 
Id. at 852. 
141 SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 13. This could cause problems for news organiza-
tions that routinely destroy notes after publication. For example, there was evidence in 
Zurcher that the Stanford Daily had adopted a policy of destroying photographs of dem-
onstrators if served with a subpoena. See note 65 supra. Such evidence, of course, would 
satisfy the statute's "destruction of evidence" exception. 
,ao Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 101(b)(4). 
111 SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 13. The drafters also indicated that the judge or 
magistrate should consider both the privacy interests protected by the Act and the inter-
est in full appellate review. Id. 
111 It has been suggested that this exception could be invoked anytime a subpoena is 
contested "[s)ince any delay in a judicial proceeding may, in some sense, be threatening 
to the interests of justice." House Hearings, supra note 4, at 31 (testimony of Paul 
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"subpoena first" rule and the policy favoring full appellate re-
view. Moreover, most of the situations where the "interests of 
justice" demand an immediate search are covered by the other 
exceptions to the "subpoena first" rule provided in the stat-
ute. iaa The legislation should not have been weakened by inclu-
sion of this vague standard as a further exception to the rule. 
Instead, the court should be required to make a specific finding 
that the severity of the crime and the immediacy of the need for 
the materials sought, coupled with the societal importance of the 
case, outweighs the privacy and due process interests 
involved. 114 
The statute, however, fails to include an important exception 
to the "subpoena first" rule. Because warrants typically are 
sought in the early stages of an investigation, the police do not 
always know who is the occupant or owner of the premises to be 
searched.1611 In such cases, a subpoena would be inappropriate 
because the police would not know on whom to serve the sub-
poena. Even if that person is known, he may try to evade being 
served with the subpoena.1116 The statute, therefore, should pro-
vide specifically that resort to a subpoena is excused where the 
occupant or owner of the premises to be searched cannot be 
located. 1117 
c. Burdens of proof- For both work product and documen-
Davis, President, Radio Television News Directors Association). 
118 There are, however, situations not covered by the exceptions to the "subpoena 
fint" rule where criminal investigations would be frustrated by the long appellate pro-
cess available to subpoenaed persons. For example, the "interests of justice" would be 
threatened where exhaustion of appellate remedies would cause difficulties in meeting 
the applicable statute of limitations or the provisions of the federal Speedy Trial Act. 
· See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 14 (prepared statement of Philip Heymann, Assis-
tant to the U.S. Attorney General). The "interests of justice" exception, therefore, 
lhould be retained but its language should be made more specific. See note 154 and 
accompanying text infra. 
114 See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 32 (prepared statement of Paul Davis, Presi-
dent, Radio Television News Directors Association). As it stands now, the Act does not 
specifically require the judge or magistrate to engage in this balancing. See Privacy Pro-
tection Act, supra note 5, at § 101(b)(4). The only guidance comes from the drafters' 
comments. See note 151 and accompanying text supra. 
, .. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 561. Traditionally, the police were not 
required to name the owner or occupant of the premises to be searched when requesting 
a warrant. United States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanger v. United 
States, 398 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1968); Dixon v. United States, 211 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1954). 
, .. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 312-13 (testimony of James B. Zagel, National 
District Attorneys Association) . 
.., The magistrate, however, should determine that the police have made a "good 
faith" effort to locate the owner or occupant. See, e.g., S. 1816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
I 3(3) (1979) ("a warrant may issue if ... the identity of the person in possession or 
control of the matter sought cannot be determined within a reasonable time with reason-
able effort"). 
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tary materials, the statute provides different burdens of proof to 
show that an exception applies, depending on the exception be-
ing invoked. If the suspect exception is relied on, the police must 
establish its applicability by "probable cause. "1118 For all other 
exceptions, the police need only establish "reason to believe" 
that an exception applied. m There is no reason to provide dif-
ferent standards, however. The probable cause standard for in-
voking the suspect exception is not very exacting; the courts 
have interpreted probable cause in other contexts merely to 
mean reasonable suspicion.180 The "reason to believe" standard 
would lower even this minimal requirement further, authorizing 
searches by warrant where the police merely suspect that one of 
the exceptions applies.181 Although it is not the statute's purpose 
to place insurmountable obstacles before the police, the Act 
should require more than mere suspicion. Because probable 
cause is easily established and because it has an established 
meaning, 182 the police should be required to satisfy this burden 
whenever they invoke one of the exceptions to the "subpoena 
first" rule. 
3. A suggested reform: abolish the distinction between 
"work product" and "documentary materials"- Many of the 
problems with the specific exceptions in the Act could be allevi-
ated by relatively minor amendments. One problem with the 
168 Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § lOl(a)(l). 
••• Id. § 101(b)(2)-(3). 
110 With respect to arrest warrants, all that is required is that a "reasonably discreet 
and prudent man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense 
charged" and that the person named in the warrant committed the offense. Dumbra v. 
United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925). Evidence that would justify conviction is not 
required; all that is needed is a "reasonable ground for belief of guilt." Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). A similar standard applies to search warrants. 
1
•
1 Several persons testifying before Congress said that the term "reason to believe" 
means simply "mere suspicion on the part of law enforcement officers." See, e.g., House 
Hearings, supra note 4, at 94 (testimony of Jerry Friedheim, Executive Vice-President, 
American Newspaper Publishers Association). The term, however, is undefined by the 
case law. See HousE REPORT, supra note 81, at 24-25 (supplemental views of Reps. Hyde, 
Lungren, Sensenbrenner and Volkmer). 
The problem with using "reason to believe as a standard is illustrated by the disagree-
ment between House members over the meaning of the term. Supporters of Zurcher 
legislation stated that the "reason to believe" standard "is higher than mere suspicion, 
but ... is considerably less demanding than 'probable cause.'" Id. at 8. However, oppo-
nents of the legislation stated that the Act would raise the normal "probable cause" 
standard "to require an additional 'reason to believe.' " Id. at 24. Because of this confu-
sion, it is preferable to employ a standard such as "probable cause" which already enjoys 
an established meaning. See note 160 and accompanying text supra. 
••• See note 160 supra. This established meaning would provide "definitive legal 
guidelines." House Hearings, supra note 4, at 90 (testimony of Charles Bailey, Editor, 
Minneapolis Tribune, and Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee of the Ameri-
can Society of Newspaper Editors). 
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statute, however, would require major rev1s1on: the distinction 
between work product and documentary materials. This distinc-
tion is troubling for two reasons. First, the distinction does not 
further the First Amendment interests which Zurcher legislation 
was designed to protect, the rights of the press to gather and 
disseminate information to the public. To safeguard these inter-
ests, supporters of Zurcher legislation sought to protect a re-
porter's confidential sources and to prevent the police from 
blocking publication by removing materials from the news-
room. 168 Th--e distinction between work product and documen-
tary materials does nothing to meet this goal. Documentary 
materials are as likely as work product to contain information 
that may compromise confidential sources if revealed to the 
police. 1 " Likewise, documentary materials may be as essential as 
work product to publication. 186 Therefore, no justification exists 
based on the importance of these materials to First Amendment 
processes for favoring work product over documentary 
materials. 168 
Second, the distinction is likely to cause severe problems of 
proof for the police. Whether or not certain items are work prod-
uct or documentary materials depends entirely on the subjective 
intention of the party in possession to disclose the information 
to the public.187 As a practical matter, obtaining evidence of 
such intent is impossible in the earier stages of investigations 
when warrants normally are sought.188 A final determination of 
the nature of the items sought, therefore, could not be made un-
'" See pt. I B 2 supra. 
'" For example, an internal newspaper memorandum detailing the identity of confi-
dential sources for the purpose of determining their reliability, although a "documentary 
material," see Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at§ 107(a), would not be considered 
"work product" because the information was not created for public communication. See 
id. § 107(b)(2). Such a memorandum, however, would be highly damaging to the persons 
named if the police saw it. 
11
" For example, the documents used as the basis for the Pentagon Papers case, al-
though "documentary materials," would not have been considered "work product" be-
cause they were secret and therefore were not created for public disclosure. See id. If 
these materials were removed before journalists had a chance to take notes on them, the 
Pentagon Papers story could never have been published. 
,.. There was no suggestion from journalists testifying before Congress that they 
feared searches for work product more than those for documentary materials. In fact, 
some commentators point out that newsrooms are unlikely to separate work product 
from documentary materials, and that "any search that is conducted under the ... stat-
ute is likely to uncover both." House Hearings, supra note 4, at 45 (prepared statement 
of John H. F. Shattuck, Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington Office). 
117 See notes 126-30 and accompanying text supra. 
118 See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 349 (prepared statement of Robert W. 
Johnson, County Attorney of Anoka County, Minnesota). 
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til after the search was executed and the party searched litigated 
the question in court. To avoid this confusion, the distinction 
should be abandoned and all items sought from third parties 
should be subject to the same exceptions. Because the excep-
tions provided by the statute for documentary materials are rea-
sonable accommodations of legitimate law enforcement interests, 
these exceptions should also apply to work product rather than 
limiting the exceptions for searches of documentary materials to 
the two limited exceptions provided for work product. 
C. Remedies for Violations 
To enforce its provisions, Congress provided a civil cause of 
action for damages stemming from violations of the Act.169 The 
drafters hoped to accomplish the dual purpose of compensating 
victims of illegal searches for their injuries, and of deterring 
future police illegality. 170 But a civil damage remedy, standing 
alone, is unlikely to achieve either goal because such remedies 
traditionally have proved ineffective in the search and seizure 
context. 
The statute provides that any person aggrieved171 by a viola-
tion of the Act may institute a civil action for damages.171 The 
Act specifically grants the federal district courts subject matter 
jurisdiction without the usual $10,000 amount-in-controversy 
requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.173 This 
waiver of the jurisdictional amount is desirable because of the 
problems civil litigants encounter in trying to show more than 
••• The Act provides that "[a] person aggrieved by a search for or seizure of materials 
in violation of this Act shall have a civil cause of action for damages .... " Privacy Pro-
tection Act, supra note 5, at § 106(a). 
170 For example, the drafters noted that preventing governmental units from asserting 
the "good faith" defense available under § 106(b) to individual officers would both pro-
vide a "fair means of assuring compensation for damages" and "enhance the deterrent 
effect of the statute." SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 15. 
171 The aggrieved party referred to in the statute is the party possessing the materials 
illegally seized by the police. The drafters indicated that the Act is not intended to alter 
rules of standing to bring an action for unlawful search and seizure. Because the purpose 
of the statute is to protect innocent third parties in possession of documents and papers, 
it is only these persons who may avail themselves of the remedies provided for in the 
Act. Consequently, persons to whom the information relates - the criminal suspect -
would lack standing to bring suit for the claimed violation. Id. at 14. 
171 See note 169 supra. 
,.. The Act provides that the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under this section." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 4, at § 106(h). 
The drafters indicated that this provision was specifically designed to overcome the 
$10,000 amount in controversy requirement of the federal rules. SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 81, at 16. 
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nominal damages for violations of civil rights laws. 174 The stat-
ute also provides that the aggrieved party may recover actual 
damages sustained as a result of a violation. Where only nominal 
damages can be shown, the plaintiff is entitled to recover liqui-
dated damages of not less than $1,000.1711 In addition, the court 
in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees and other 
litigation costs.178 
The problem with this remedial scheme is that civil litigants 
in search and seizure cases often encounter considerable diffi-
culty in identifying the extent of their injuries in money terms. 
There often is little direct injury to the person or property of the 
victim as a result of the search, and injury to reputation is diffi-
cult to quantify. 177 Although the statute does provide for liqui-
dated damages of not less than $1,000, this is unlikely to provide 
sufficient incentive for plaintiffs to sue. Violations of the Act, 
therefore, are likely to go unremedied. 
Even if the plaintiff is able to show substantial damages, other 
obstacles remain to recovery. The statute permits the plaintiff to 
proceed directly against the individual officer involved in the il-
legal search.178 However, plaintiffs in search and seizure cases 
are often unable to obtain favorable verdicts against individual 
officers. The Act specifically provides the individual officer with 
a "good faith" defense178 which is difficult to overcome because 
it requires a showing that the officer did not act reasonably in 
carrying out the search. 180 In addition, plaintiffs in police mis-
"' See note 177 and accompanying text infra. 
170 Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 106(f). 
178 Id. The statute, however, prohibits the court from holding a governmental unit 
liable for interest prior to judgment. Id. 
177 See Gelles, supra note 114, at 693. 
178 Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 106(a)(2). 
11
• Id. § 106(b) ("It shall be a complete defense ... that the officer or employee had a 
reasonable good faith belief in the lawfulness of his conduct."). 
'"" See Project, supra note 114, at 803. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 
108-09 (testimony of John H.F. Shattuck, Director, American Civil Liberties Union, 
Washington Office) ("good faith" defense requires plaintiff to show that the officer acted 
with actual malice). 
This is not to suggest, however, that the "good faith" defense be abandoned. If officers 
do indeed have a reasonable "good faith" belief in the lawfulness of their conduct, they 
should be protected because otherwise the police might hesitate to act in critical situa-
tions, thereby crippling effective law enforcement. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 429 (1971) (Black, J., dissent-
ing). The problem is that many juries misapply the defense by focusing on the subjective 
good faith of the officer and ignoring the objective standard of reasonableness which the 
defense requires. See Project, supra note 114, at 802-03. The defense thus makes ·it 
doubly difficult for civil litigants to obtain a favorable judgment, which diminishes the 
compensatory and deterrent function of the civil damage remedy. Because the "good 
faith" defense makes sense, however, a different, complementary remedy to civil damage 
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conduct cases face considerable hostility from juries tradition-
ally sympathetic to law enforcement.181 Finally, even if the 
plaintiff succeeds in obtaining a favorable verdict, actual re-
covery is unlikely. Most policemen and other civil servants are 
"judgment proor• because they are not paid enough to satisfy 
large damage awards.182 These problems make the civil damage 
action against individual officers ineffective to accomplish either 
the compensation or deterrence goal of the remedy. 
The Act also provides that the plaintiff may proceed against 
the governmental unit responsible for the offending officer. 
Where a federal officer violates the statute, the aggrieved party 
may sue the United States directly.188 Where the action is 
against a state officer or employee, however, the state can be 
held responsible for damages resulting from the violation only if 
it has waived its sovereign immunity.m If the state has not 
waived its immunity, the plaintiff must proceed against the indi-
vidual officer involved.1811 By enabling. litigants to sue the gov-
ernmental entity involved, Congress sought to provide a "deep 
pocket" of funds to pay for any actual damages sustained. 
Where the governmental unit is the United States government, 
this "deep pocket" is readily available because the litigant can 
sue the federal government without regard to whether or not it 
has waived its sovereign immunity.188 When the plaintiff at-
tempts to hold a state or local government responsible, however, 
the statute only permits suits when the governmental unit has 
waived its sovereign immunity. Few states have waived their im-
relief should be employed. 
1
•
1 Juries generally are biased against plaintiffs in police misconduct suits because of 
the image of authority and respectability projected by policemen, the "good faith" de-
fense available to the defendant, and the plaintiff's reputation, race or lifestyle. See Pro-
ject, supra note 114, at 783-84. See also Gelles, supra note 114, at 692-93; Note, "Dam-
ages or Nothing"-The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 667, 
692 (1979); Note, Reviewing Civilian Complaints of Police Misconduct-Some Answers 
and More Questions, 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 89, 93 (1974). 
181 See Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal 
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 787 (1970); Gelles, supra note 114, at 694. 
In many cases, of course, either the individual officer is insured or is indemnified by 
the police department for any damages incurred as a result of an illegal search. See 
Project, supra note 114, at 810-12. While this provides a source of funds for potential 
litigants, it decreases the deterrent value of the civil damage remedy by insulating the 
offending officer from personal liability for the misconduct. Id. at 814-15. 
181 Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at§ 106(a)(l). The Act permits the Attorney 
General to settle a claim for damages brought against the federal government. It also 
requires that the Attorney General promulgate regulations for imposing administrative 
sanctions against the offending officer. Id. § 106(g). 
184 Id. § 106(a)(l). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 14. 
,ea Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 106(a)(2). 
188 Id. § 106(a)(l). 
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munity from liability for the acts of their officials in other con-
texts, 187 and are unlikely to do so in the situation presented 
here. The plaintiff, therefore, will in most cases have to look to 
the individual officer for relief. 
Several solutions to these problems are possible. First, to in-
crease the likelihood that litigants will be able to reach an ade-
quate source of funds to pay for damages, Congress should 
amend the statute to permit direct suits against the state or lo-
cal government responsible for the off ending officer, regardless 
of whether or not it has waived its sovereign immunity.188 This 
will insure that the officer's lack of resources will not deter po-
tential plaintiffs from suing; it also will have the salutary effect 
of encouraging state and local governments to exercise greater 
supervision of police practices to minimize the risk of lawsuits. 189 
Second, Congress should at least double the amount of liqui-
dated damages that a successful plaintiff is sure to receive. The 
current amount is slightly more than nominal, and increasing 
the amount of liquidated damages would provide greater incen-
tive for plaintiffs to sue. An increase would also make proof of 
actual damages less significant. Finally, Congress should en-
hance the deterrent effect of the remedy. Because of the difficul:.. 
ties that civil litigants have in proving actual damages beyond 
the liquidated amount, the police may find that it is worth pay-
ing a few thousand dollars to obtain crucial evidence from a 
third party. Under the present scheme the police can "buy out" 
the privacy rights proteced by the Act if they think that the 
benefits of obtaining the evidence outweigh the cost. To prevent 
this, Congress should first provide for punitive damages assessa-
ble against the individual officer in cases of particularly egre-
gious conduct.190 Punitive damages supplement compensatory 
'"' For example, while some jurisdictions permit suits directly against the state for the 
acts of state officials, see Herman v. State, 78 Misc. 2d 1025, 357 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Ct. Cl. 
1974), most jurisdictions do not. See W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND 
CONFESSIONS § 167.03 (Supp. 1978). 
188 Congress may, under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorize direct suits 
against the state for search and seizure violations. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 
456 (1976): "Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the pur-
pose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits 
against States .... " For a discussion of constitutional issues raised by the Privacy Pro-
tection Act, see pt. II D infra. 
. '" See Project, supra note 114, at 817-18. 
100 In the Senate version of the Act, violators were subject to "such punitive damages 
as may be warranted." S. 1790, § 106(0, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in SENATE 
REPoaT, supra note 81, at 3. The aggrieved party under this version was entitled to col-
lect such damages either from the individual officer or the governmental unit responsible 
for the officer. SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 14-15. However, municipalities should 
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damages and insure that the police will not be able to "buy their 
way out" of violations of the Act for less than substantial 
sums.191 In addition, Congress should provide that evidence ob-
tained in violation of the statute cannot be used in any sub-
sequent criminal proceeding.192 This third-party exclusionary 
rule-similar to the one now available in some circumstances to 
criminal suspects-193 could be invoked by the aggrieved party 
where there is a substantial, intentional violation of the Act. 1" 
This would remove the temptation to risk a minimal damage 
award to obtain crucial evidence while at the same time insuring 
that merely technical or "good faith" violations of the statute do 
not result in the exclusion of valuable evidence.1911 By supple-
not ordinarily be liable for punitive damages unless they have affirmatively sanctioned 
the egregious conduct of the individual officer. Cf. Monell v. New York City Department 
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities can be held liable for violations of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, only if the deprivation of the plaintiff's 
rights was caused by "official" policies or customs). 
m Punitive damages ordinarily should be reserved for those occasions where the of-
ficer's conduct was intentional or malicious. Cf. Gelles, supra note 114, at 686 n.261 (dis-
cussing proposals to limit the exclusionary rule to "substantial violations"). 
1" The statute currently provides that "[e]vidence otherwise admissible in a proceed-
ing shall not be excluded on the basis of a violation of this Act." Privacy Protection Act, 
supra note 5, at § 106(e). The drafters recognized that the failure to provide for the 
exclusion of illegally seized evidence could permit the government to deliberately violate 
the Act so it can obtain evidence to be used against another party, but they said they 
expected "that the Department of Justice and state and local Jaw enforcement authori-
ties will not allow the provisions regarding exclusion of evidence . . . to be manipulated 
in bad faith by their officers and agents." SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 15. 
m The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of evidence at the trial of a crimi-
nal suspect which was seized in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
194 Third parties currently Jack standing to invoke the exclusionary rule to exclude 
evidence obtained in violation of their rights because the evidence is not being used 
against them. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. at 130-32. Moreover, the suspected 
criminal also may lack standing to invoke the rule for evidence seized in an illegal third-
party search because normally his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Cf. 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (co-defendants and co-conspirators can-
not prevent evidence seized illegally from another defendant from being introduced 
against them). Absent a specific provision in the statute, therefore, evidence seized ille-
gally from third parties could rarely be excluded by reliance on the exclusionary rule. 
Although they specifically rejected a third-party exclusionary rule for the statute, ,ee 
note 192 supra, the drafters were concerned that standing requirements for assertion of 
the exclusionary rule could become "a sword to be used by the government to permit it 
deliberately to invade one person's Fourth Amendment right in order to obtain evidence 
against another person." SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 15, (quoting United States v. 
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 738 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
186 This is the same standard as that suggested for deciding whether or not to award 
punitive damages, except that the judge or magistrate should consider the public interest 
in obtaining evidence for the prosecution of serious crimes when deciding whether the 
rule should apply. See note 190 supra. See also S. 881, 93rd Cong., 1st Seu. (1973) 
("Evidence shall not be excluded ... unless the court finds, as a matter of law, that such 
violation was substantial"). 
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menting the civil damage remedy in these ways, Congress can 
provide greater assurance that the statute will not be violated 
and that victims of illegal searches will be compensated for their 
injuries. 196 
The reason for limiting the third-party exclusionary rule to those 11ituations where the 
violation was "substantial" is that commentators have questioned the continued applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to all illegal searches. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary 
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970); Spiotto, The Search and 
Seizure Problem-The Canadian Tort Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. 
POLICE Sci. & AD. 36 (1973). Several Supreme Court justices also have criticized the rule 
when applied to situations involving "good faith" violations. See California v. Minjares, 
443 U.S. 916 (1979) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Biv-
ens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
415-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Despite these criticisms, many commentators 
believe that effective alternatives to the rule do not exist. See Canon, Is the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclu-
sion, 62 Kv. L.J. 681 (1974); Gelles, supra note 114, at 689-720. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961) ("other remedies have been worthless and futile" in deterring 
illegal police searches). 
Because the exclusionary rule ordinarily is not available to third parties, see note 194 
and accompanying text supra, a statutory third-party exclusionary rule would greatly 
expand the situations where the rule would apply. This extension of the rule should not 
occur at a time when its continued efficacy is increasingly questioned without some limi-
tations. A "substantial violation" test, while not wholly satisfactory because it is some-
what subjective, see Gelles, supra note 114, at 706-09, would provide some limits while at 
the same time insuring that the rule is available for extreme violations of the Act. 
For the same reasons, only the third party whose rights were violated should be per-
mitted to invoke the statutory exclusionary rule. To permit the party to whom the 
materials relate-that is, the suspected criminal-to invoke the rule would unjustifiably 
broaden its scope and would provide the criminal with a "windfall" when the criminal's 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the search. 
,.. Aside from the civil damage remedy and the exclusionary rule discussed supra, 
three other possible remedies exist. The first is a criminal sanction. See, e.g., S. 3222, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (up to one year imprisonment for violations). The problem 
with this remedy is that it requires prosecutors to institute a criminal action against 
persons with whom they work closely every day. See Gelles, supra note 114, at 713-14; 
Note, Reviewing Civilian Complaints, supra note 181, at 93-94. 
The two other possibilities are injunctive and declaratory relief. See, e.g., H.R. 322, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (court shall award "such relief as may be appropriate, in-
cluding ... equitable or declaratory relier'). These remedies, however, generally are re-
garded as ineffective to correct or prevent illegal police searches. See Gelles, supra note 
114, at 715-17; Note, Reviewing Civilian Complaints, supra note 181, at 94-97. But see 
Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 
YALB L.J. 143 (1968) (federal injunction effective in certain circumstances). 
Of course, the ineffectiveness of such remedies does not mean they should not be pro-
vided for in the statute. The more avenues a potential litigant has open, the more likely 
the statute will be enforced. See, e.g., H.R. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which pro-
vides a combination of remedies, including general damages, equitable and declaratory 
relief, punitive damages up to $100,000, costs and attorney's fees, plus a third-party ex-
clusionary rule. 
Regardless of what additional remedies Congress provides, it should include a specific 
provision establishing a statute of limitations for actions under the Act. The Act cur-
rently is silent on the time limit for bringing suit against violators, and this could prove 
to be a problem. In general, where a federal statute is silent on the question, the statute 
556 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 14:3 
D. Constitutional Basis for the Act 
The Privacy Protection Act imposes a federal "subpoena first" 
rule on all levels of government - federal, state and local.197 
This uniform application of the statute is desirable because oth-
erwise residents of a state that has enacted Zurcher legislation 
would be protected from unrestricted third-party searches while 
residents of a neighboring state that has failed to enact such leg-
islation would not. 198 Such disparity of treatment is intolerable 
where federal constitutional rights are at stake, particulary when 
most third-party searches are likely to occur at the state and 
local level. 199 A key concern of supporters of a uniform federal 
response, however, has been whether Congress has exceeded its 
constitutional authority by restricting search and seizure at the 
state and local level. 200 The statute relies on Congress, power to 
regulate interstate commerce as authority for imposing a federal 
"subpoena first,, rule on the states.201 Under the commerce 
of limitations of the particular state where the violation occurred applies. Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976) (§ 1981 suits); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (§ 1981); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 
(1960) (§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 
463-64 (1947); McC!aine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905). Having different statutes of 
limitations apply in different states, however, is undesirable because the purpose of the 
Privacy Protection Act is to provide a uniform federal rule applicable equally in all 
states; it also may create problems when searches are conducted by police from different 
jurisdictions. To avoid this result, Congress should specifically provide a statute of limi-
tations in the Act. See, e.g., H.R. 322, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) ("A person aggrieved 
by a violation . . . may bring an action . . . no later than three years after such violation 
is committed, or one year after such violation is discovered, whichever is later."). 
,., SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 9. 
'" At least eight states have passed legislation restricting third-party searches. See 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524 (West Supp. 1980); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-33a (1979); ILL. REv. 
STAT. ch. 38, § 108-3 (1979); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1979-80); OR. REv. STAT. § 44.520 (Supp. 1979); TBX. CRIM. 
PRo. STAT. ANN. § 18.0l(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT. § 968.13 (1979). The great 
majority, however, have not. 
'" For example, all instances of newsroom searches since 1970 have occurred at the 
state or local level. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 43-46 (prepared statement of 
Philip Heymann, Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General). See also the testimony of 
Anthony Day, Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, id. at 128 ("It is the States and not the Federal Government from 
which we expect most of our problems"). 
100 See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 335-42 (memorandum from Mitchell Arnold, 
Communications Law Clinic of New York Law School). The only real dispute is whether 
Congress can impose a federal criminal procedure rule on state officials; Congress clearly 
has jurisdiction to regulate federal criminal procedure under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3771 
(1976). Id. at 336. 
101 The statute's protections are limited to persons involved in activities "in or affect-
ing interstate or foreign commerce." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at§ 101. The 
drafters relied on the commerce clause "because disseminating information regularly af-
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clause, 101 Congress has wide latitude in defining when certain 
intrastate activities unnecessarily burden interstate .commerce, 
and in fashioning an appropriate remedy to remove the bur-
den.103 However, there are two problems with relying on the 
commerce clause. First, the Supreme Court recently has at-
tempted to cut back on Congress' power to regulate purely intra-
state activities through the commerce power by · interposing an 
independent state autonomy barrier to federal legislation that 
operates "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional government func-
tions. "104 The extent of this limitation is unclear, soe1 but it casts 
doubt on the authority of Congress by virtue of its commerce 
power to impose a federal "subpoena first" rule on the states. 
More importantly, the commerce clause only reaches those sub-
jects that can arguably be characterized as affecting interstate 
commerce. This includes "even activity that is purely intrastate 
in character ... where that activity, combined with like conduct 
by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the 
states."106 But the reach of this power is not unlimited; certain 
purely intrastate matters are insulated from Congress' commerce 
power.107 The statute as it reads now only affects persons in-
volved in the dissemination of information "in or affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce. "108 Because most forms of public 
communication are considered interstate commerce,so9 relian~e 
fects interstate commerce." SENATE REPoRT, supra note 81, at 9. 
•as U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. this constitutional provision grant.a Congress the 
power to "regulate commerce ... among the several states." 
00• Coupled with the necessary and proper clause, art. I., § 8, cl. 18, the commerce 
clause empowers Congress to regulate even those activities occurring entirely within one 
state if these activities "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate com-
merce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from bur-
dens or obstructions .... " NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
"°' National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). In National League of 
Cities, the Court held that congressional attempt.a to prescribe minimum wages and 
maximum hours to be paid state employees were unconstitutional because they impaired 
the ability of the states to "function effectively in a federal system." Id. (quoting Fry v. 
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). The Court said that "there are limit.a upon 
the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising it.a otherwise 
plenary powers ... to regulate commerce .... " 426 U.S. at 842. 
- See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 61-69, 338-39 (statement of Mark Tuchnet, 
law professor, University of Wisconsin Law School; and memorandum from Mitchell 
Arnold, Communications Law Clinic of New York Law School). 
108 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975). 
007 See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 366 (testimony of Paul Bender, professor of 
law, University of Pennsylvania Law School). 
- Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 101. 
- See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128-29 (1937) ("Interstate communi-
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on the commerce power is justified. If, however, the statute is 
expanded to cover all third parties, whether or not they are in-
volved in information dissemination, 210 then reliance on the 
commerce clause would be inadequate. Because of the poten-
tially large class of people affected by the statute, it is unlikely 
that all of them are involved in activities "affecting commerce 
among the states. "211 It would unduly complicate warrant pro-
ceedings to require a case-by-case determination that a particu-
lar third party is involved in interstate commerce, and the ref ore 
an alternative source of congressional power should be relied on 
if the statute is amended to encompass all third parties. 
Although commentators have suggested other sources,212 the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the source of congressional power 
which is best suited to insuring that all third parties can be pro-
tected by the statute. 213 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is a grant of federal power over the states equal to that of the 
necessary and proper clause. 214 The Supreme Court, however, 
has been more willing to sanction direct congressional incursions 
into areas of state autonomy under section 5 than under other 
grants of federal power such as the commerce clause because the 
Fourteenth Amendment is expressly directed at the states.n11 As 
cation of a business nature, whatever the means of such communication, is interstate 
commerce regulable by Congress .... "). 
11
• See pt. II A supra. 
•
11 Professionals such as lawyers and doctors unquestionably are involved in interstate 
commerce and could be protected under the commerce clause. However, it is question-
able whether the commerce power reaches all third parties. See Senate Hearings, supra 
note 3, at 366 (testimony of Paul Bender, law professor, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School) . 
.,. For example, some have suggested that Congress could require that the states 
adopt a "subpoena first" rule as a condition to receiving federal grants. Id. at 375. 
118 The Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: 
Section 1. . . . No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
m Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879), where the Court explained the broad reach of§ 5: 
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the 
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibi-
tions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality 
of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against state denial or inva-
sion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of Congressional power. 
m Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (commerce power 
limited by reserved powers of the states), with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) 
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a result, the Court has permitted Congress to adopt broad reme-
dial measures under section 5 to effectuate the objectives of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.216 
In the context of third-party sea;ches, a strong argument ex-
ists that Congress can restrict state and local police under its 
section 5 remedial powers. As previously noted,217 unrestricted 
third-party searches pose significant dangers to both First and 
Fourth Amendment rights even when those searches are lawful. 
· In addition, these dangers are most likely to arise at the state 
level. 218 Because both First and Fourth Amendment rights are 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from state encroach-
ment, 219 Congress is empowered to employ broad remedial mea-
sures to protect these rights from infringement. Congress, there-
fore, could determine that unrestricted third-party searches at 
the state level threaten First and Fourth Amendment rights,220 
and that a federal "subpoena first" rule is necessary to minimize 
that threat. In effect, Congress would be using the federal "sub-
poena first" rule as a prophylactic device to mitigate the dangers 
posed by third-party searches.221 Most comentators agree that 
(power of Congress under Fourteenth Amendment not limited by reserved powers of the 
states). See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972); South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (Fifteenth Amendment); Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U.S. 339, 345-48 (1879). 
118 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), where the Court upheld a 
congressional ban on state literacy tests as a prophylactic device to insure that a certain 
segment of the population was not denied the right to vote. See also South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), where the Court construed the enforcement clause of 
the Fifteenth Amendment, which is essentially identical to§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as permitting Congress to fashion specific remedies for enforcing the prohibitions 
of that amendment. 
117 See pts. I B 1-2 supra. 
11
• See note 199 and accompanying text supra. 
11
• Both the First and Fourth Amendments are among the "fundamental personal 
rights and liberties" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (Fourth 
Amendment); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (First Amendment); Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (First Amendment). 
110 The courts are unlikely to question such a finding. Traditionally, the courts have 
accorded Congress a presumption that facts necessary to support the constitutionality of 
legislation exist. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1876) ("if a state of facts could 
exist that would justify such legislation, it actually did exist when the statute under 
consideration was passed"). The reason for this presumption is the legislature's superior 
factfinding abilities. See generally Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Deter-
minations, 40 CINN. L. REv. 199, 208-09 (1971). 
111 See note 216 and accompanying text supra. Of course, Zurcher specifically held 
that the Constitution does not require a "subpoena first" rule. This should not, however, 
prove an obstacle to congressional action because the Court in other contexts has permit-
ted Congress under § 5 to restrict or outlaw state practices which the Court previously 
had found constitutional. For example, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), 
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a congressional ban on literacy tests for voting 
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Congress has ample authority under section 5 to impose a fed-
eral "subpoena first" rule on both state and federal law enforce-
ment officials. 222 
CONCLUSION 
In Zurcher, the Supreme Court invited legislative action to 
provide nonconstitutional protections against unrestricted third-
party searches.228 Congress responded to this invitation with the 
Privacy Protection Act. This response is an admirable first step 
even though the Court previously had declared such tests constitutional. The Court said 
that 
a construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that enforce-
ment of a state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condi-
tion of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both congres-
sional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the 
Amendment. 
Id. at 648. Congress can therefore restrict third-party searches even though the Court 
has declared such searches constitutional . 
... See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 339-42 (memorandum of Mitchell Arnold, 
Communications Law Clinic, New York Law School); Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 
365-79 (testimony of Paul Bender, law professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
and William Cohen, law professor, Stanford University Law School). 
The Court recently has attempted to set limits on congressional power under § 5, but 
the extent of these limitations is unclear. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), a 
sharply divided Court (five Justices wrote separate opinions) invalidated that portion of 
the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 which lowered the minimum voting age in 
state elections from 21 to 18 as an unconstitutional assertion of congressional power 
under§ 5. The fragmented nature of the opinion, however, negates much of its force as 
precedent. See Cox, supra note 220, at 223-39 (Mitchell an "eclectic" ruling that does 
not signal a significant restriction on congressional power under § 5). See also Cohen, 
Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 
603, 617-18 "(1974). 
More importantly, Zurcher is distinguishable from Mitchell. In Mitchell, the congres-
sional legislation conflicted with a specific constitutional provision,· art. I, § 2, which gives 
the states the power to set qualifications for voting in state elections. In Zurcher, how-
ever, only the more nebulous reserved powers of the states under the Tenth Amendment 
block the assertion of congressional authority, and it was these reserved powers that were 
significantly reduced by the Fourteenth Amendment. See note 215 and accompanying 
text supra. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 112 (testimony of John H.F. 
Shattuck, Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington Office). 
In addition, the Justices in Mitchell were unanimous in upholding the power of Con-
gress to suspend otherwise lawful literacy tests as a means of eliminating the threat of 
racial discrimination in voting. This is further support for the theory that Congress could 
adopt a "subpoena first" rule as a prophylactic device designed to prevent police abuses 
in the context of third-party searches. See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 376-77 
(testimony of William Cohen, law professor, Stanford University Law School). 
11
• The Court said, "Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not prevent or advise 
against legislative or executive efforts to establish nonconstitutional protections against 
possible abuses of the search warrant procedures .... " Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 
U.S. at 567. 
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in dealing with the concerns Zurcher raised. Although the gov-
ernmental interest in effective law enforcement is fundamental 
and must be preserved, that interest should be effectuated by 
the least intrusive means possible to insure against inadvertent 
infringement of important personal rights and liberties.214 The 
federal "subpoena first" rule adopted by Congress represents a 
reasonable accommodation of law enforcement interests and in-
dividual rights. It should be lauded for its attempt to balance 
these two important but sometimes conflicting interests. 
The congressional response to Zurcher, however, is incom-
plete. Although the Act safeguards the First Amendment rights 
of the press and others involved in information dissemination, it 
leaves the general public's right to privacy virtually unprotected. 
This right to privacy is a fundamental right22' of equal stature 
with the First Amendment rights of the press; as such, it must 
be protected "not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but 
also from being stifled by more subtle governmental inter-
ference. "228 Congress should re-examine the issue of third-party 
searches and complete the task it began with passage of the Pri-
vacy Protection Act. 
-Jose M. Sariego 
11
• In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized a "less drastic means" doctrine in First 
Amendment cases. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("Even though the 
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by 
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more 
narrowly achieved."). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); NMCP v. 
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); see generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First 
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969). 
116 See note 219 supra. AB the Supreme Court itself has recognized: "The security of 
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the 
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 45 (1949). 
11
• Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). 

